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This dissertation consists of three essays on labor and experimental economics. The first two chapters address gender
differences in labor markets. The third chapter is a methodological contribution to experimental economics. Chapter
1 presents work from an experimental study on gender differences in returns to negotiation. The study presents a first
examination of a negotiation-ban counterfactual. The study looks at manager-selected compensation when workers
can and cannot negotiate their salary in an environment where workers perform either high or low productivity tasks.
We find that when negotiation is allowed, a gender earnings gap emerges among high productivity workers. A similar
gender earnings gap is not present when negotiation is not permitted. Chapter 2 presents work from a study on gender
differences in executive departure rates. The study asks whether the higher departure rates of female executives relative
to male executives can be explained by differences in ability or if other factors are also contributing to the departure rate
gap. Using exogenous changes in firm performance coming from industry wide fluctuations, the study demonstrates
that the departure rate gap cannot be explained by ability alone. The study provides evidence that, instead, the gap is
consistent with attribution bias. Chapter 3 presents work from a study that tests whether the slider task is responsive
to incentives. Using a between-subject design with three different piece rates: half a cent, two cents, and 8 cents, we
find that the performance response in the slider task is very inelastic to incentives. Following a 1500% increase in
incentives, output only increased by 5%. This study cautions researchers that the slider task may be underpowered in
between-subject experiments that use typical experimental sample sizes.
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1.0 BANNING NEGOTIATION: IS DIFFERENTIAL PAY ELIMINATED OR SUSTAINEDWHEN LEFT
TO MANAGER DISCRETION? (CO-AUTHORS: RANIA GIHLEB AND LISE VESTERLUND)
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Does allowing for salary negotiation lead to increased wage inequality among workers? According to 84% of adults
recently surveyed in the United States, the answer is yes.1 It is also believed that in the presence of gender differences,
allowing for negotiation may contribute to the gender wage gap. In the same survey of United States adults, women
indicate that they are less likely than men to negotiate for their starting salary and are more likely than men to prefer
environments in which negotiation is not allowed.2 The belief that salary negotiation contribute to gender pay gaps in
labor markets has lead some corporations to consider banning salary negotiation. One of the most notable examples of
a Negotiation-Ban policy was the one enacted by former interim CEO of Reddit, Ellen Pao, in 2015.3 The Negotiation-
Ban has been lauded by some as being an effective policy to reduce gender wage disparities (Kray, 2015).
Proponents of Negotiation-Ban policies have pointed to a growing body of research suggesting that in many cir-
cumstances, women negotiate less often than men (Babcock and Laschever, 2003), may experience weaker gains
from negotiation (Dittrich et al., 2014), and may even experience backlash from negotiation (Bowles et al., 2007).
Negotiation-Bans are not without critics; some of the primary arguments against banning negotiations is that doing
so may frustrate more skilled workers causing them to reduce their output and that if managers have implicit gender
biases, Negotiation-Bans may not reduce and could even increase gender wage disparities.4,5
1Results from an MTurk Survey (n=317) that asked “In which company do you think the difference in worker earnings is the largest” (A
company that allows/does not allow for salary negotiation). Sample is restricted to those that correctly answer attention checks.
2When asked whether they negotiated the starting salary at their most recent job, 37% of men (n=182) and 27% of women (n=133) said they
did (two-sided t-test, p=.03). We exclude the two participants that indicated they have never been employed. When asked whether they would prefer
an environment that allows for salary negotiation, 93% of men (n=183) and 87% of women (n=134) indicated that they would (two-sided t-test,
p=.05).
3Other examples of companies or company affiliates that have publicly stated they do not allow salary negotiations include former Principle
Recruiter for Google Engineering, Bob See, on Quora (http://qr.ae/TUpHPj) and The Guardian article by Communications Director, Carys Afoko,
of SumOfUs (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/02/ban-individual-salary-negotiations-gender-pay-equality).
4See, for instance, this blog post by consulting firm The Azara Group (http://www.theazaragroup.com/banning-salary-negotiations-ellen-pao/),
this article in HR Magazine (https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0915-salary-Negotiation-Bans.aspx), and Wharton Professor
Bidwell quoted in this article by Mashable (https://mashable.com/2015/04/06/ellen-pao-reddit-salary/).
5One commonly seen suggestion by opponents of Negotiation-Bans is that, rather than removing the option to negotiate, women should be
encouraged to enter into negotiations more often. Evidence from Exley et al. 2018, however, demonstrates that such advice is misguided; pushing
women into negotiation does not improve their outcomes. Women that refrain from negotiation are harmed by being forced into negotiation.
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Despite the significant attention Negotiation-Bans have received by media, business professionals, and schol-
ars alike, to our best knowledge no study has formally tested the implications of a Negotiation-Ban. The finding
that women frequently benefit less than men in environments with negotiation does not necessarily imply that a
Negotiation-Ban will reduce gender inequality in compensation. If managers hold implicit gender biases, as critics of
Negotiation-Ban policies suggest, Negotiation-Bans could have no or negative effects on creating more equitable earn-
ings distributions within a workplace. To determine whether Negotiation-Ban policies may reduce gender inequality
in compensation, this study provides the first examination of outcomes from a setting where individuals are allowed
to negotiate to the counterfactual outcomes from a setting where individuals are banned from negotiating.
We conduct a laboratory experiment in a two-worker environment with repeated interaction in which workers
within a workgroup perform separate tasks that differ in productivity. Participants assigned to the role of worker
complete their assigned real-effort task to secure earnings for their group. Participants assigned to the role of manager
view their worker characteristics and output and must decide how to split earnings between the two workers in their
group. Manager earnings are purely a function of their workers’ output and thus are not affected by their compensation
decisions; however, the repeated nature of the experiment means that manager compensation decisions may affect their
future earnings via changes in worker output. We vary whether workers can engage in private negotiation with their
manager. In our Negotiation treatment, workers can choose to enter negotiations with their manager prior to the
manager deciding worker compensations. By contrast, workers in our Negotiation-Ban treatment do not have the
option of entering negotiations.
We design our experiment to rigorously test the potential for a Negotiation-Ban to be an effective policy at re-
ducing gender wage gaps. As such, we designed our experiment to increase the likelihood of total worker output
decreasing under a Negotiation-Ban and to increase the likelihood of managers’ implicit biases affecting their com-
pensation decisions under a Negotiation-Ban. The heterogeneity in task productivity helps to accomplish both goals.
The heterogeneity creates more room for manager’s implicit biases to affect their compensation decisions. Further,
heterogeneity in task productivity creates a higher compensation demand among high-productivity task workers and
may lead to diminished productivity when they are unable to negotiate for higher pay. Finally, the repeated matching
in our environment ensures managers are incentivized to compensate workers in a manner that will maximize total
output.
We show that, contrary to what has been suggested by critics of Negotiation-Bans, worker output does not decrease
for either worker in the presence of a Negotiation-Ban. This suggests that critics’ concerns about Negotiation-Bans
leading to decreased effort among high-productivity workers are likely unfounded. As further evidence, we also show
that dispersion in the share of output produced by high-productivity task workers within worker groups is the same
between treatments.
In examining manager compensation decisions, we show that managers indeed experience a trade-off between
their own fairness ideals and the desire to maximize total worker output. As such, the majority of compensation
2
decisions are shaded in favor of the high-productivity worker but do partially account for the difference in relative task
difficulty. Unlike previous studies that have examined multi-worker environments (for instance, see Gross et al. (2015)
and Bolton and Werner (2016), this paper is the first to ask how wage compression differs in environments with versus
without negotiation. We find inequality of both the dollars earned by workers (pooled over both tasks) and the share
of earnings received by high-productivity task workers are both lower when negotiation is banned. Combining this
finding with the result that dispersion in output share is the same across treatments, our study suggests that banning
negotiation leads to increased wage compression.
We further demonstrate that the reduction in earnings inequality is largely coming from groups in which the
high-productivity worker is male. Focusing on individual returns to negotiation, we show that this result can be
explained by the fact that only male workers assigned to the high-productivity task benefit from entering negotiation;
female workers on the high-productivity task and all low-productivity task workers do not experience any return from
entering negotiation. Using coded chat data, we determine that this gap is partially due to the fact that only high-
productivity workers benefit from threatening to reduce output and that male workers are much more likely to use
threats. However, even after controlling for a broad assortment of negotiation styles, we still find gender differences
in returns to negotiating for high productivity workers.
Our findings demonstrate that, in contrast to critics’ concerns about Negotiation-Ban policies, under such a ban
gender gaps in earnings decrease and productivity does not decrease. As such, this study provides encouraging evi-
dence to support the possibility of Negotiation-Ban policies being effective at reducing compensation inequalities that
emerge from gender differences in returns to negotiation. Furthermore, we demonstrate that eliminating the ability of
high productivity workers to leverage their greater bargaining power, such policies have the added benefit of reducing
earnings inequalities in environments where workers perform equally demanding tasks that differ in productivity.6
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Subsection 1.2 provides a detailed description of our experimental
design. We describe the data in Subsection 1.3, detail the results in Subsection 1.4, and discuss factors that may affect
differences in returns to negotiation in Subsection 1.5. Finally, in Subsection 1.6 we conclude.
1.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We design our experiment using ZTree (Fischbacher, 2007a). In order to create room for managers to have subjective
assessments of worker performance, workers in our experiment are randomly assigned to perform one either a high-
productivity task and a low-productivity task. To ensure managers’ compensation choices affect their future earnings,
our experimental design uses repeated matching between managers and workers. The remaining paragraphs in this
section describe our experimental design in detail.
6One example of such an environment is a workplace where workers sell similar or identical products to different demographics. For instance,
pharmaceutical representatives with sales areas that differ in the how urban versus rural they are.
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Participants in our experiment are evenly split between Managers, Green Workers (low-productivity task), and
Blue Workers (high-productivity task) at the beginning of the experiment. We use colors to refer to the two types of
workers to avoid experimenter demand effects. Each participant is placed into a group consisting of one Manager, one
Green Worker, and one Blue Worker. Participants stay in their role and group for the duration of the experiment.
In our experiment, we use a between-subject design consisting of a “Negotiation” treatment and a “Negotiation-
Ban” treatment. In the Negotiation treatment, workers have the opportunity to initiate a negotiation with their manager
whereas in the Negotiation-Ban treatment, there is no opportunity to negotiate. In both treatments, Participants face
five work rounds. In the Negotiation treatment, these rounds consist of a production stage, a negotiation stage, and
a payment-selection stage. In the Negotiation-Ban treatment, these rounds consist only of a production stage and a
payment-selection stage.
For each round, workers have 120 seconds to perform their work task during the production stage. Each unit of
output produced by a worker secures $0.025 for the manager and $0.05 for joint worker earnings. During the payment-
selection stage, the manager views both worker output and worker characteristics (as provided at the beginning of the
experiment) and must decide how to split joint worker earnings between the two workers in their group. In the
negotiation treatment, the payment-selection stage is preceded by a negotiation stage in which workers can pay $0.05
out of their personal earnings to initiate a negotiation where they may engage in free form text chat privately with their
manager for up to three minutes.
The instructions provided to participants contain information on each role, the two different work tasks, and – in
the negotiation treatment – a description of how negotiations take place. Instructions also contain screenshots of each
work task and the manager decision screen. At the beginning of the experiment, prior to having read the instructions or
learned their assigned role, participants complete a brief survey asking for their year in college, age, gender, major, and
whether they attended high school in Pennsylvania. These answers are provided later to the manager in the workers’
group. Instructions are read out loud to guarantee that the structure of the experiment is common information. After
reading instructions, participants learn their assigned role and workers are given 30 seconds to practice their assigned
work task. In the subsequent paragraphs, we discuss each aspect of the experiment in more detail.
1.2.1 Production Stage and Work Tasks
At the beginning of the experiment, participants are assigned to either the Green Worker role or the Blue Worker role.
The two worker roles differ in the task they must perform during each production stage. Green workers perform a
Slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2012) while Blue workers perform a Typing task. We ex-ante expected the Typing task
to be a higher productivity task than the Slider task. We chose to have workers perform two different tasks to create
room for managers to form subjective evaluations about relative worker performance. This wiggle room increases the
possibility for us to observe differences in worker earnings resulting from negotiation, and for it to potentially vary
with worker characteristics such as gender. Each unit of output produced by a worker increases manager earnings in
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their group by $0.025 and joint worker earnings by $0.05. We selected these earnings amounts because they allow
managers the option to have all group members earn the same if they select a 50/50 split between the two workers.
Additionally, having tasks that differ in productivity but not returns to a unit of output also allows for subjectivity in
terms of what split of earnings is fair.
During each production stage, workers have 120 seconds to complete their assigned task. Workers assigned to the
Slider task see a screen displaying 48 sliders offset from one another. To complete one unit of output, the workers
must position the marker of the slider at exactly 50. To position a marker, workers must click on the marker with
their mouse and drag it horizontally to the desired location. Information on the present location of the marker is only
updated after releasing the mouse. Total output for the Slider-worker in a given period equals the number of sliders
for which the marker is correctly positioned at 50 by the end of the production stage.
Workers assigned to the Typing task (Typing-workers) are shown a screen with two boxes located side by side.
Initially, the box on the right contains a letter highlighted in red and the box on the left is blank. After a Typing-worker
correctly types the letter in the box on the right, the letter turns black and a new letter highlighted in red appears in the
left box. Correctly typing the letter in the left box completes a letter pair. After a letter pair is completed the screen is
reset; the worker is given a new letter highlighted in red in the right box and the left box is blank. Total output for the
Typing-worker in a given period equals the number of letter pairs completed by the end of the production stage.
Managers view updates of their workers’ progress during the production stage. Specifically, managers are shown
a progress screen updated every 10 seconds. The progress screen provides the survey answers for the two workers in
their group, current output by each worker in the given period, current total output in the given period, current manager
earnings, and current joint worker earnings.
1.2.2 Negotiation Stage
In the Negotiation treatment, after completing the production stage, workers are given the opportunity to pay $0.05
to privately negotiate with the manager in their group. We chose to make negotiation costly to ensure workers do not
simply initiate negotiations to pass time and also to better mirror the fact that workplace negotiations are costly in
terms of time-required, risk, and emotional energy.
If a worker initiates a negotiation, they will have up to three minutes to engage in free-form chat privately with the
manager in their group. Free form chat allows for a multitude of negotiation tactics. Once a worker is done negotiating,
they have an option to leave the chat window and are taken to a waiting screen until after both the negotiation stage
and the payment-selection stage is done. Managers do not have the option to exit the chat window. Workers that do
not enable chat are immediately taken to this waiting screen. Doing this prevents workers from learning about whether
or for how long the other worker in their group is chatting.
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If both workers select into negotiation, the manager is given a separate chat window for each worker. If a worker
decides not to negotiate, the manager is not given a window for that worker. Once both workers have finished negoti-
ating or if neither worker initiates a negotiation, the manager is immediately taken to the payment-selection stage.
1.2.3 Payment-Selection Stage
During the payment-selection stage, Managers see their earnings for the period, joint worker earnings, individual
characteristics (from survey responses) of their two workers, the workers’ assigned roles, and the output of each
worker in their group. Using a payment selection bar, the Manager selects a value P between 0 and 1 in increments of
0.01 to determine what share P of joint worker earnings will be paid to the Slider-worker. The remaining (1-P) share is
given to the Typing-worker. Managers in the negotiation treatment also have an option of reviewing their negotiations
for the given period. Once all managers complete the payment selection stage, all participants are shown a summary
screen of each workers’ output in the given period and the earnings of each member in their group.
1.2.4 Follow-up Activities
After participants complete the five rounds of the main experiment, they complete a modified dictator game task that
allows us to identify any explicit taste-based discrimination. Participants are matched into new groups of three for this
task. Participants are no longer assigned roles in this task. Each participant sees the survey responses for the two other
individuals in their group and must decide how to allocate $5 between their two group members. For each group, we
randomly select one group member’s decision to implement. The selected group member earns $2.50 and the other
two group members earn the specified split.
After completing the modified dictator task, participants complete a survey that asks about their perceptions of task
difficulty. This measure allows us to ask whether Managers’ beliefs affect their compensation decisions. Following
this, we ask participants what they believe a fair split would be for three different output levels: 10 sliders and 90 letter-
pairs; 25 sliders and 75 letter-pairs; 40 sliders and 60 letter-pairs. Finally, participants complete a brief demographic
survey.
1.3 DATA
The study was advertised as a 90-minute decision-making study with a guaranteed minimum payment of $6 and
expected average earnings that would exceed this amount. No additional details were given about the study.7 252
7To facilitate achieving gender-balanced sessions, we created two separate studies for each session: one for male participants and one for
female participants. Potential participants can only view studies they are eligible for. Thus, we were able to discreetly recruit equal numbers of men
and women for each session.
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undergraduate students participated in fourteen sessions at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL).
Each session included eighteen participants. We used PEEL’s SONA system database to recruit student participants.
From the main experiment, additional payments from follow-up activities, and the $6 show-up fee, average earnings
were $22.70.
For each session males and females were (unbeknownst to them) signing up on two separate study lists, this helped
us to secure a relatively gender balanced sample. The average percentage of female participants across sessions was
48%. The average age of participants was 19.69, with 99% ranging from age 18 to 23. Most participants (46%) were
majoring in Business or Social Sciences, followed by Engineering or Natural Sciences (35%), and other or undeclared
majors (19%). The study consisted of 84 manager-worker groups. We observe 41 groups in the Negotiation treatment
and 41 groups in the Negotiation-Ban treatment. For each group, we observe 5 rounds of data.
1.4 RESULTS
In this section, we ask four main questions. First, pooling the data for our two treatments, we confirm that our tasks
differ in productivity and ask how managers choose to distribute earnings between the high- and low-productivity-
task workers. We then ask whether removing the option to negotiate affects the distribution of compensation. After
observing differences in the distribution of compensation between treatments, we ask whether the individual worker
benefits from engaging in negotiation, and whether this varies with the worker’s task. Finally, we ask whether manager
compensation decisions and the effect of removing negotiation differ by worker gender.
When considering compensations, managers face two key considerations. First, managers may wish to pick the
compensation scheme that they deem to be fair given the output of the high- and low-productivity task worker in their
group. Second, managers may consider how their compensation choice will affect worker output in the subsequent
periods. Given that workers assigned to the high-productivity task can secure greater manager earnings, this second
motivation may cause managers to select higher compensation for high-productivity-task workers by more than they
otherwise would. This could in turn lead to managers making compensation choices differently in the last period
(when the need to incentivize future performance is removed) compared to the first four periods. Thus, we anticipate
decision behavior by managers may exhibit significant end-game effects. Given that we are primarily interested in
work environments in which workers will have continued interaction with their employer, we restrict much of the
remaining analysis to only include the first four rounds of decision data.
1.4.1 How do Managers Compensate Workers?
In this subsection, we examine worker output and the corresponding manager compensation choices pooling data from
the Negotiation and Negotiation-Ban treatments. We begin by comparing average output between the two tasks. As
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shown in Table 1.1, we confirm that with an average output of 87.3 letter-pairs per period versus and average output
of 26.6 sliders per period, the typing-task is indeed a higher productivity task than the slider-task. Given that the
typing-task is likely to be more familiar to participants than the slider task, one concern may be that this productivity
difference falls over time; however, as demonstrated in Figure 1.1, the gap in output between the two tasks remains
relatively constant. Finally, in response to critics’ concerns that a Negotiation-Ban may reduce output among high
productivity workers, we compare worker output between treatments. Figure 1.2 shows clearly that this is not the
case. If anything, absent the ability to negotiate, worker output is slightly higher.
Figure 1.1: Output over Time by Worker Task
If managers care solely about output, we would expect to see average Typing-workers earning 3.28 times that
of the average Slider-worker. Instead, Table 1.1 shows that the mean period earnings for a Typing-worker is $3.35
while the mean period earnings for a Slider-worker is $2.45. That is, Typing-workers on average earn 1.37 times that
of Slider-workers. While this is substantially less than the difference we observe in output, it is transparent that the
Typing-worker is compensated for greater productivity. Using a two-sided t-test, we reject that Slider-workers and
Typing-workers have the same earnings (p=0.00).
8
Figure 1.2: Output over Time by Worker Task and Treatment
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Pooled Negotiation Negotiation-Ban
Letter-Pairs 87.3 86.6 88.0
(13.8) (14.1) (13.6)
Sliders 26.6 26.1 27.2
(5.1) (5.4) (4.7)
Typing-Worker Earnings $3.25 $3.25 $3.25
(0.76) (0.79) (0.72)
Slider-Worker Earnings $2.45 $2.39 $2.51
(0.71) (0.74) (0.68)
Joint Worker Earnings $5.70 $5.64 $5.76
(0.78) (0.80) (0.75)
N 420 210 210
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Joint Worker Earnings is the sum of Slider
and Typing-worker earnings within a group.
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To further illustrate the differences between what workers produce and what they receive, Figure 1.3 compares the
distributions of each workers’ contribution to joint worker earnings in a given period (left panel) to the distributions
of each workers’ compensation in a given period (right panel). If workers are paid just what they contribute, the left
and right panels should be identical. In contrast, under full wage compression, the earnings distributions for the Slider
and Typing-worker should be identical. Figure 1.3 shows that earnings are somewhere in between the two extremes.
While the worker contribution distributions are disjoint except for a very small number of zero-output observations,
there is partial overlap in the distributions of the Typing- and Slider-worker earnings. In other words, we find evidence
of partial wage compression between the two workers.
Figure 1.3: Distribution of Worker Output and Worker Earnings
Compensation decisions may vary over time, however, if it takes time for managers to learn about relative task
difficulty or if end-game effects exist. Figure 1.4 shows a modest decrease in earnings differences over the first
four periods with the largest increase occurring after the first period; however, the difference in compensation shrinks
substantially more in the final period even though there is no similar decline in Typing-worker output in the final period
(Figure 1.1). We see a similar pattern when we instead look at the share of joint worker earnings being produced by
the Typing-worker and compare it to the share of joint worker earnings being allocated to the Typing-worker in Figure
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1.5. These results suggest that while there are slight learning effects by managers, end game effects are much more
pronounced. Given the substantail end-game effects, we restitrict our remaining analysis in this study to the first four
periods except where noted otherwise.
Figure 1.4: Earnings over Time by Worker Task
One of the primary differences between the first four periods and the last period is that managers no longer face the
possibility that their compensation choice will affect future productivity of their workers. As such, the compensation
decision in the final period is likely to be more reflective of what the manager perceives to be a “fair” allocation of joint
worker earnings between the two workers. The fact that we see a decline in Typing-worker earnings and earnings share
in the final period suggests that incentive concerns lead managers to compensate Typing-workers more than their fair
share because Typing-workers have higher potential productivity. As further evidence of this, we use mangers survey
responses to calculate their perceived difficulty adjusted output share produced by the Typing-worker. We show in
the appendix that the majority of compensation decisions are greater than this difficulty adjusted share and that the
difference is considerably smaller in the fifth period.
To summarize, we confirm that the Typing-task is a higher productivity task than the Slider-task and find that in
an environment where managers decide how to allocate earnings between two workers that differ in their productivity,
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Figure 1.5: Relative Production and Compensation over Time
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managers engage in some wage compression (as shown in Figure 1.3). This wage compression, however, is less than
what managers would select if they were to compensate workers solely based on perceived effort (as shown in the
appendix). Given that wage compression increases in the last period, this is likely due to incentive concerns faced by
the manager. Furthermore, consistent with Gross et al. (2015) and Bolton and Werner (2016), the fact that Slider-
worker output increases over time suggests Slider-workers accept the unequal distribution of earnings at least to the
extent that they do not reduce effort due to discouragement or dissatisfaction with being a lower earner.8
1.4.2 What are the Institutional Effects of a Negotiation-Ban?
Having confirmed that worker productivity differs by task and that our environment produces partial wage compres-
sion, we ask whether the imposition of a Negotiation-Ban affects the relative distribution of compensation by worker
task. While Typing-workers that enter into negotiation increase their earnings, this does not necessarily imply that im-
posing a ban on negotiation will affect the relative earnings of Typing versus Slider-workers. As an example, suppose
that when workers have the option to negotiate, managers provide a boost to compensation above what they believe is
fair only to the Typing-workers that demand higher wages via negotiation; however, in an environment without nego-
tiation, managers boost compensation only for those Typing-workers that they believe would demand higher earnings
if negotiation were available. If manager beliefs about who would negotiate are sufficiently accurate, then we would
not expect to see the enactment of a Negotiation-Ban affecting the relative earnings distribution.
To answer whether a Negotiation-Ban affects the relative earnings distribution, we calculate the Gini coefficient
for each treatment. We start by pooling per-period earnings for both the Slider-workers and the Typing-workers.
Table 1.2 shows that the Gini coefficient for pooled earnings is 0.17 in the Negotiation treatment and 0.15 in the
Negotiation-Ban treatment– an 11.7 percent decrease that is significant at the 5% level. This reduction in inequality
is equivalent to imposing an 11.7 percent proportional tax on workers in the Negotiation treatment and redistributing
the tax revenue as equal sized amounts to each individual worker (Aaberge, 1997). While we observe a reduction in
earnings inequality in the Negotiation-Ban treatment, it is possible that this inequality reduction could be the result
of reduced inequality in output. Thus, we next turn to looking at the inequality in the share produced by the Typing-
worker and the share earned by the Typing-worker. The benefit of these latter measures is that they control for who
the other worker is paired with. Table 1.2 shows that we observe no significant decrease in the share produced. We do,
however, observe that the Gini on share earned falls by a statistically significant amount from 0.11 to 0.088 moving
from the Negotiation to Negotiation-Ban treatment. From this, we conclude that imposing a Negotiation-Ban leads to
a reduction in compensation inequality even after accounting for output differences. 9
8Mean Slider-worker output is consistent with that found in Araujo et al. (2016); however, improvement over time actually occurs at a steeper
rate in our study. This suggests that, if anything, Slider-workers in our environment exert more effort than in a piece rate payment environment.
9An alternative method used for measuring inequality is to compare the earnings of the 90th percentile with those of the 10th percentile.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.2 show that this measure produces similar, albeit weaker, results.
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Table 1.2: Gini Coefficient and 90-10 Ratio, By Treatment
Gini: Negotiation Gini: Ban 90-10: Negotiation 90-10: Ban
Pooled Earnings 0.17 0.15** 2.2 1.96*
(-0.008) (-0.006) (-0.11) (-0.08)
Pooled Output 0.32 0.31 4.62 4.39
(-0.009) (-0.007) (-0.176) (-0.131)
Share Produced by Typng Worker 0.035 0.028 1.14 1.13
(-0.006) (-0.0016) (-0.014) (-0.009)
Share Earned by Typing Worker 0.11 0.088** 1.54 1.49
(-0.0081) (-0.0038) (-0.078) (-0.056)
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Stars indicate significance for two-sided t-test between treatments. Bootstrapped
standard errors in parentheses. Observations restricted to first four periods. Pooled output includes both Slider task and Typing task
output. Pooled earnings includes both Slider-worker and Typing-worker earnings.
To summarize, does a Negotiation-Ban matter for the relative distribution of earnings between workers? The
answer is a clear yes. The imposition of a Negotiation-Ban leads to a substantial decline in compensation inequality
among workers. Furthermore, given that we do not observe distributional changes in relative production, this reduction
in inequality is not explained by any changes in output across treatments. Put differently, these results demonstrate
that while wage compression exists in our environment, allowing workers to negotiate increases earnings inequality
and thus reduces wage compression.
1.4.3 Why does a Negotiation-Ban Reduce Compensation Inequality?
Given our finding of reduced compensation inequality under a Negotiation-Ban, it is likely that managers are re-
sponding to workers attempts to negotiate when it is allowed. There are three primary ways in which engaging in
negotiation may affect compensation inequality. First, Slider-workers may attempt to negotiate and experience back-
lash. Second, Typing-workers may experience positive returns from negotiating. Third, it is possible that both workers
benefit equally conditional on entering negotiation, but Typing-workers enter more frequently. In this subsection, we
begin by confirming that workers engage in negotiation. We then ask what the returns are to negotiation by worker
task.
Looking at the data from the negotiation treatments (and restricting our attention to the first four periods), we
find that workers enter negotiations 36% of the time. Although Typing-workers may have greater potential bargaining
power, we do not observe substantial differences in the overall negotiation rate between the two types of workers.
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Slider-workers enter negotiation 40% of the time and Typing-workers enter negotiation 37% of the time. Using a
two-sided t-test, we fail to reject that these rates are different (p=0.50).10
Figure 1.6 shows that the negotiation rates over time decrease in the 4th and 5th period. One explanation may be
that managers and workers reach initial agreements that cover outcomes for subsequent periods (thus decreasing the
need for subsequent negotiations). An alternative explanation is that workers anticipate returns from negotiating are
decreasing over time. We do observe some differences in the timing of negotiations between worker types. Figure 1.6
also shows that negotiation rates for Slider-workers are initially higher than for Typing-workers and reach their peak
earlier (in the second versus the third period). This difference in timing suggests Slider-workers and Typing-workers
may utilize negotiation in different ways.11
Figure 1.6: Share of Workers who Initiate Negotiation over Time by Worker Task
Given that we observe both worker types opting in to negotiation, we next ask whether it pays off to negotiate and
whether this differs by worker type. To do this, we run random effects regressions of workers’ period earnings on
the number of sliders completed in that period, the number of letter-pairs completed in that period, and an indicator
10We show in section 1.5, that while Slider- and Typing-workers enter negotiation at similar rates, they use very different negotiation tactics that
reflect their different bargaining positions.
11This is confirmed in section 1.5.
16
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the worker opted to negotiate in that period. We include period fixed effects and
cluster standard errors at the group level. We conduct this analysis separately by worker task.
As seen in column 1 of Table 1.3, Typing-workers that enter negotiation receive greater earnings in the periods
that they enter. Typing-workers who enter negotiation increase their earnings by 23.4 cents. For negotiations to yield
a positive return, however, it must be the case that the net return to negotiation (i.e., the return minus the 5 cent
negotiation fee) is positive and significant. Testing for this, we find the net return, 18.4 cents is significantly different
from zero (p=0.04). In contrast to Typing-workers, Slider-workers do not benefit from initiating a negotiation. While
we estimate that the coefficient on negotiation entry is 7.98 cents, we cannot reject that this is different from zero.
Thus, only Typing-workers appear to benefit from initiating negotiations.
As further evidence that it is differential returns to negotiation entry driving the differences in inequality between
institutions we regress Typing-worker earnings on output and negotiation entry pooling together both treatments. We
add an indicator variable for the Negotiation-Ban treatment and control for negotiation entry by workers (note that
the indicator variable for entry into negotiation will be 0 for all workers in the Negotiation-Ban treatment). Table 1.4
shows that for Typing-workers, the coefficient on Negotiation-Ban is small and insignificant whereas the coefficient
on Entry is positive, significant, and of a similar magnitude to our estimates from Table 1.3. This suggests that Typing-
workers that do not enter negotiation are paid similarly across treatments. As such, differences in earnings between
treatments are primarily coming from positive returns to entry experienced by Typing-workers.
The result that only Typing-workers benefit from entering negotiations suggests that the reduction in compen-
sation inequality under a Negotiation-Ban is likely due to Typing-workers no longer being able to leverage their
high-productivity position to demand greater compensation from the manager. This demonstrates an additional benefit
stemming from Negotiation-Ban policies; in workplaces where workers perform equally demanding tasks that differ
in potential productivity, Negotiation-Bans can reduce earnings inequality between high and low productivity workers
that result from high-productivity workers receiving preferential treatment. Such policy implications may be desirable
for companies that wish to implement meritocratic fairness ideals.
1.4.4 Gender
In addition to finding an overall difference in inequality following a Negotiation-Ban, it is also possible that the
response to a Negotiation-Ban varies by gender. While it is generally found that women negotiate less frequently
than men and secure smaller gains from negotiation on average, these results are highly context dependent (Mazei
et al., 2015). In certain instances, the gender gap in returns to negotiation may even be reversed.12 Given that in
our environment the heterogeneity in tasks increases situational ambiguity about what is a “fair” split and given that
workers are negotiating on behalf of themselves (Bowles et al., 2005), we hypothesize that males will experience a
lager return to negotiation than females in our environment.
12For instance, when negotiating on behalf of others, women may fare better than men (Bowles et al., 2005).
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Table 1.3: Per-Period Worker Earnings: Negotiation
Treatment
(1) (2)
Typing-Worker Slider-Worker
# Letter-Pairs 0.0374∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗
(0.00252) (0.00291)
# Sliders 0.0185∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗
(0.00725) (0.00827)
Negotiation Entry 0.234∗∗∗ 0.0798
(0.0639) (0.0841)
Constant -0.347 0.0755
(0.253) (0.301)
N 168 168
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level and are shown in parentheses. Observations
are restricted to the first four periods. Results are from random effects
regressions of money given to the Typing-worker within a period in the
negotiation treatment. All regressions include period fixed effects.
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Table 1.4: Worker Compensation Pooling over Both
Treatments
(1) (2)
Typing-Worker Slider-Worker
# Letter-Pairs 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗
(0.00261) (0.00265)
# Sliders 0.0143∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗
(0.00579) (0.00618)
Entry 0.236∗∗∗ 0.0859
(0.0658) (0.0778)
Negotiation-Ban 0.00524 0.113
(0.105) (0.106)
Constant -0.0273 -0.179
(0.251) (0.264)
N 336 336
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Observations are
restricted to first four periods of data. Standard errors are clustered
at the group level and are shown in parentheses. Results are from
random effects regression on per-period worker earnings. Entry is a
binary variable that equals one if the worker enters negotiation in the
given period. Negotiation-Ban is a binary variable that equals one in
the Negotiation-Ban treatment. All regressions include period fixed
effects.
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Absent negotiation, differential treatment of workers by gender can still occur however as a result of implicit
biases held by managers tasked with selecting worker salaries. Even if males fare better in the negotiation treatment,
it is not clear that a policy that bans negotiation will necessarily lead to reduced gender differences in compensation.
Thus, we also test the implications of a Negotiation-Ban on gender differences in earnings by comparing outcomes for
mixed-gender groups in the Negotiation treatment to outcomes in the Negotiation-Ban treatment.
For all analysis in this section, we restrict our attention to only mixed-gender groups. The rest of this section
proceeds as follows, in section 1.4.4.1 we begin by providing an overview of the data for our mixed-gender group
subsample. Next, in subsection 1.4.2.2, we ask whether differences in the distribution of compensation between treat-
ments vary by the gender composition of worker groups. After observing the treatment effect of banning negotiation on
compensation distributions differs by the gender composition of worker groups, we ask in subsection 1.4.2.3 whether
returns to negotiation differ by worker gender.
Our primary goal in this subsection is to test whether a Negotiation-Ban reduces the gender differences in overall
earnings that results from negotiation. We find that a Negotiation-Ban reduces the earnings advantage of the Typing-
worker and does so more for males than for females. As a result, imposing a Negotiation-Ban reduces compensation
inequality more in male high-productivity worker groups. We conclude than a Negotiation-Ban may be an effective
policy at reducing gender earnings gaps that result from negotiation.
1.4.4.1 Overview of Mixed-Gender Group Subsample Our data consist of 17 same-gender worker groups and
67 mixed-gender worker groups.13 By treatment, we observe 36 mixed-gender worker groups (7 same-gender) for
the Negotiation treatment and 31 mixed-gender worker groups (11 same-gender) for the Negotiation-Ban treatment.
Focusing on the mixed-gender worker groups, we observe 19 Male Typing – Female Slider groups and 17 Female
Typing – Male Slider groups in the Negotiation treatment. We observe 17 Male Typing – Female Slider groups and 14
Female Typing – Male Slider groups in the Negotiation-Ban treatment.
Recall that managers were able to observe four characteristics about the workers in their group in addition to
worker gender: age, major, year in school, and whether the worker attended high school in Pennsylvania. Before
turning to our primary data analysis, we first note that there are no gender differences in these other measures. The
average age for male workers is 19.69 and for female workers is 19.83 (two-sided t-test, p=0.49). The share of male
workers that attended high school in Pennsylvania is 41% and the share of female workers is 45% (two-sided t-test,
p=0.66). The share of male workers that are freshman, sophomore, and junior or above is 32.9%, 23.5%, and 43.5%
respectively. For female workers, the distribution is 20.5%, 31.3%, and 48.2%. Using a Fischer’s exact test, we are
unable to reject the hypothesis that these two distributions are the same (p=0.17). For major choice, 36.5% of male
workers are Natural Science or Engineering majors, 50.6% are Business or Social Science, and 19.3% are Other or
13To increase the likelihood of having male-female worker groups while being discreet and still allowing for quasi-random assignment of roles
and groups, we used seating cards to assign participants to seats and drew from two separate shuffled stacks of cards – one for men and one for
women.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics: Mixed Gender Pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled Pooled Negotiation Negotiation Ban Ban
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Typing Typing Typing Typing Typing Typing
# Letter-Pairs 83.7 87.5 83.71 84.3 83.8 91.4
(14.2) (12.4) (15.2) (12.7) (13.0) (11.0)
# Sliders 24.9 27.5 23.9 26.8 26.1 28.2
(4.6) (5.3) (4.0) (5.9) (5.0) (4.42)
Typing-Worker 3.12 3.32 3.25 3.20 2.97 3.46
Earnings (0.71) (0.69) (0.80) (0.75) (0.57) (0.60)
Slider-Worker 2.32 2.43 2.13 2.36 2.53 2.52
Earnings (0.64) (0.63) (0.66) (0.57) (0.56) (0.69)
Joint-Worker 5.43 5.74 5.38 5.56 5.49 5.98
Earnings (0.77) (0.70) (0.85) (0.70) (0.67) (0.62)
N 144 124 76 68 68 56
Notes: Observations are restricted to first four periods of data and mixed gender pairs only. Standard deviations
are in parentheses. Joint Worker Earnings is the sum of Slider and Typing-worker earnings within a group.
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Undeclared. For female workers, 37.4% are Natural Science or Engineering majors, 43.4% are Business or Social
Science, and 19.3% are undeclared. Using a Fischer’s exact test, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that these two
distributions are the same (p=0.47).
Table 1.5 shows that Female Typing-workers perform slightly better on average than Male Typing-workers. In
contrast, Female Slider-workers perform slightly worse than Male Slider-workers.14 As a result, average joint worker
earnings are lower in the Male Typing, Female Slider groups resulting in slightly lower earnings for these workers.
Finally, we note that men and women are not equally likely to initiate negotiations. The share of male Typing-workers
who initiate negotiations is 43% compared to 31% for female Typing-workers (one-sided t-test, p=0.061). Similarly,
male Slider-workers initiate negotiations 49% of the time compared to 37% for female Slider-workers (two-sided t-
test, p=0.079). This is consistent with previous literature that finds women tend to enter negotiation at lower rates than
men (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). We can for neither gender reject that negotiation entry rates are independent of
worker task (p=0.54 for males and p=0.45 for females).
1.4.4.2 Do the Institutional Effects of a Negotiation-Ban Differ by Gender? To answer whether the effects
from imposing a Negotiation-Ban on compensation inequality differ by the gender composition of worker groups, we
calculate the Gini coefficient and 90-10 ratio on relative output and relative earnings for each treatment and gender
paining separately.15 We start by looking at male Typing-worker groups. Table 1.6 shows that Gini coefficient on
the share produced by the Typing-worker is not significantly different between treatments. Thus, dispersion in output
among male Typing-workers is similar between treatment. Looking next at the share allocated to the Typing-worker,
we observe that for male Typing-worker groups, the Gini coefficient falls from 0.12 in the Negotiation treatment to
0.082 in the Negotiation-Ban treatment and that this difference is significant at the 1-percent level. This suggests
that inequality in relative earnings decreased in the Negotiation-Ban treatment. Taken together, the similar level of
output inequality between treatments paired with the decrease in earnings inequality for male workers suggests that
the earnings advantage for male Typing-workers is higher in the Negotiation treatment relative to the Negotiation-Ban
treatment.16
We do not observe the same pattern for female Typing-worker groups. As shown in Table 1.6 the Gini coefficient on
the share produced by the Typing-worker falls from 0.034 in the Negotiation treatment to 0.024 in the Ban treatment.
This difference is significant at the 1-percent level. The Gini coefficient on the share earned is not significant. Taken
together, the reduction in output inequality paired with no reduction in income inequality suggests that, if anything,
the earnings advantage for female Typing-workers is lower in the Negotiation treatment relative to the Ban treatment.
14Intriguingly, this difference is largest in the Negotiation-Ban treatment. While male Typing-workers have similar output levels across both
treatments, female Typing-workers’ output is higher in the Negotiation-Ban treatment.
15The results for the 90-10 ratio produce similar results to we observe for the Gini coefficient. Thus, we focus our discussion only on the Gini.
Both the Gini coefficient and the 90-10 ratio are reported in Table 1.6.
16When considering the 90-10 ratio, the results are different, but produce a similar conclsion. Output inequality increases by a significant
amount, and there is no significant change in earnings inequality. Combined, these two effects also imply that the earnings advantage for male
Typing-workers is higher in the Negotiation treatment relative to the Negotiation-Ban treatment.
22
Table 1.6: Gini Coefficient and 90-10 Ratio, By Treatment and Gender Composition
Male Typing-Worker Female Typing-Worker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Negotiation Ban Negotiation Ban
Panel A. Gini Coefficient
Share Produced 0.035 0.031 0.034 0.024∗∗∗
by Typing-Worker (0.011) (0.002) (0.0033) (0.0020)
Share Earned 0.12 0.082∗∗∗ 0.088 0.093
by Typing-Worker (0.013) (0.006) (0.0086) (0.0056)
Panel B. 90-10 Ratio
Share Produced 1.11 1.15∗∗ 1.17 1.12∗
by Typing-Worker (0.010) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014)
Share Earned 1.52 1.36 1.46 1.53
by Typing-Worker (0.11) (0.076) (0.077) (0.059)
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Stars indicate significance for two-sided t-test between
treatments. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Observations are restricted to mixed-gender
groups and the first four periods only. Pooled output includes both Slider task and Typing task output.
Total output is the sum of Slider task and Typing task output. Pooled earnings includes both Slider-worker
and Typing-worker earnings.
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1.4.4.3 Why do the Effects of a Negotiation-Ban Differ by Gender Composition? Differences in compensation
and output inequality by worker gender compensation, suggest that male typing-task workers experience a reduced
earnings advantage following a Negotiation-Ban and female typing-task workers experience (if anything) an increased
earnings advantage following a ban. This suggests that male and female workers may experience different returns to
negotiation. In this subsection, we explore this possibility.
To formally test whether there exist gender differences in returns to negotiation, we use a random effects regression,
clustering standard errors at the group level, to estimate the return to negotiation in a given period by worker task and
gender. As before, we restrict our attention to the first four periods. We begin by confirming that we observe similar
returns to negotiation in our subsample as we do in Table 1.3. The first column of Table 1.7 shows that, when ignoring
worker gender, we see positive returns to negotiation for Typing-workers and column 3 shows that we observe no
return to negotiation for Slider-workers. This matches what we observed in our full sample regressions. Specifically,
the coefficient on Entry (a dummy variable that equals one in periods that a worker enters negotiation) is 21.1. This
reveals a positive net return from negotiation (probability different from $0.05, p=0.033). Thus, as with our full
sample, we confirm that negotiation only benefits the workers assigned to the high-productivity task.
Next, we consider how our results change when we separately control for gender and the interaction between
negotiation and gender. In the second column of Table 1.7, we show positive returns to negotiation for Typing-workers
of 38.1 cents (probability different from $0.05, p=0.001). Interestingly, however, these returns are only experienced
by male Typing-workers. The interaction term Entry*Female is negative, highly significant, and nearly the same as the
magnitude for the coefficient on Entry. Thus, the positive return to negotiation is fully cancelled out for female Typing-
workers. We observe no such gender differences in returns to negotiation when we look at the Slider task (Column
4 of Table 1.7). These results partially confirm our hypothesis that only male workers benefit from negotiation.
Specifically, we find that only male workers assigned to the Typing-task benefit from negotiation. Female Typing-
workers and Slider-workers of both genders do not benefit. The results also are consistent with our earlier findings –
negotiation does not benefit workers on the low productivity task.
Given that we observe male Typing-task workers earning a positive return, but not female Typing-task work-
ers, we test whether this leads to gender earnings gap conditional on negotiation. To do this, we test whether Fe-
male+Entry*Female is different from zero. We find that the earnings gap conditional on negotiation is 29.0 cents and
thus reject the null that this gap equals zero (p=0.074). As a result, we conclude that under negotiation, we observe a
gender earnings gap among high-productivity workers that negotiate.
The finding that only male, high-productivity task workers benefit from negotiation is consistent with our finding
that male-typing task workers experience a reduced earnings advantage following a Negotiation-Ban. As further
evidence that it is this differential return to entry driving the gender differences in compensation differences across
treatments, we regress Typing-worker earnings on output and negotiation entry pooling together both treatments. We
add an indicator variable for the Negotiation-Ban treatment, an indicator variable for negotiation entry by workers,
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Table 1.7: Per Period Worker Earnings: Negotiation Treatment, Mixed Gender Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Typing-Worker Typing-Worker Slider-Worker Slider-Worker
# Letter-pairs 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗
(0.00243) (0.00258) (0.00274) (0.00293)
# Sliders 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗
(0.00866) (0.00815) (0.00905) (0.00885)
Entry 0.211∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.0904 0.112
(0.0755) (0.0962) (0.0906) (0.134)
Female 0.00244 -0.122
(0.157) (0.178)
Entry X Female -0.395∗∗∗ -0.0509
(0.147) (0.172)
Constant -0.617∗∗ -0.727∗∗ 0.415 0.555
(0.271) (0.303) (0.310) (0.342)
N 144 144 144 144
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Observations are restricted to mixed-gender groups only and first
four rounds of data. Standard errors are clustered at the group level and are shown in parentheses. Results are
from random effects regression on per-period worker earnings. Entry is a binary variable that equals one if the
worker enters negotiation in the given period. All regressions include period fixed effects.
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and interact both with worker gender. Doing this allows us to test whether we observe differences in earnings across
treatments (both overall and by worker gender) after controlling for gender differences in returns to negotiation. As
shown in Table 1.8, neither Negotiation-Ban, Female, nor their interaction are significant. In contrast, Entry is positive
and significant and Entry x Female is negative, significant, and of a similar magnitude to the coefficient on Entry.
Thus, gender differences in the effects of a Negotiation-Ban on compensation inequality are due to gender differences
in returns to negotiation.
To summarize, we find that only male workers assigned to the high productivity task experience positive returns to
negotiation. Under a Negotiation-Ban policy, worker output does not decrease, and the relative earnings advantage of
male typing-task workers does decrease. As a result, a ban leads to a reduction in the gender gap in compensation.
1.5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we ask why it is that only high-productivity males benefit from negotiation. When considering the role
negotiation plays in determining compensation, workers may use negotiation to try and sway manager beliefs about
their relative task difficulty, they may try to use negotiation to win the manager over via likeability, or they may try
to threaten the manager with reduced future performance. If negotiation tactics have differing levels of effectiveness
and workers differ by gender in their method of negotiating, this could generate the observed differences in returns to
negotiation. In this section, we separately consider each of these possible explanations.
1.5.1 Does Negotiation Affect Manager Beliefs?
We first ask whether manager beliefs differ by treatment and worker-gender composition. If negotiation affects man-
ager beliefs, then we should observe this when comparing manager survey responses across treatments. Similarly, if
male Typing-workers are more effective at swaying manager beliefs, we should see manager beliefs in the Negotiation
treatment differing by worker-gender composition.
We consider two different measures for manager beliefs. The first measure Letter-pairs Needed is the manager’s
reported number of letter-pairs they believe are equal in effort to 15 sliders. This measures manager beliefs about
relative difficulty. Our second measure for manager beliefs, Fair Allocation, is the manager reported share they believe
is fair to allocate to the Typing-worker after observing output of 25 sliders and 75 letter-pairs. This question is intended
to measure manager perceptions of fairness.
Looking across treatments (Table 1.9, panel a), and across worker-gender composition by treatment (Table 1.9,
panels b & c), we observe no significant differences in manager beliefs of relative difficulty or of fairness. Thus, it
appears unlikely that the observed returns to negotiation are due to workers affecting manager beliefs. Not surprisingly,
when looking at worker beliefs, we do observe significant differences by assigned role. Slider-workers believe 60.35
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Table 1.8: Typing Worker Compensation Pooling over
Both treatments: Mixed Gender Pairs
(1) (2)
Typing-Worker Slider-Worker
# Letter-pairs 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
(0.00287) (0.00296)
# Sliders 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗
(0.00703) (0.00733)
Entry 0.388∗∗∗ 0.109
(0.0985) (0.125)
Female 0.0251 -0.109
(0.157) (0.171)
Entry X Female -0.390∗∗∗ -0.0365
(0.146) (0.165)
Negotiation-Ban -0.168 0.0699
(0.128) (0.190)
Negotiation-Ban X 0.144 0.288
Female (0.224) (0.236)
Constant -0.300 0.133
(0.300) (0.326)
N 268 268
Notes: ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗p< 0.01. Observations are restricted
to mixed-gender groups only and first four rounds of data. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the group level and are shown in parentheses. Re-
sults are from random effects regression on per-period worker earnings.
Entry is a binary variable that equals one if the worker enters negotiation
in the given period. Negotiation-Ban is a binary variable that equals one
in the Negotiation-Ban treatment. All regressions include period fixed
effects.
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letter-pairs are equivalent to 15 sliders whereas Typing-workers believe only 48.15 letter-pairs are equivalent to 15
sliders. Similarly, Slider-workers believe a fair allocation for the Typing-worker given an output of 25 sliders and 75
letter-pairs is 51% whereas Typing-workers believe a fair allocation is 61%. Both differences are significant at the 1%
level and show workers beliefs are somewhat self-serving.
To further test how manager beliefs about relative task difficulty affect their compensation decisions in the nego-
tiation treatment, we turn to regression analysis. Using random effects regressions with standard errors clustered at
the group level, we examine how manager beliefs affect Typing-worker earnings in the first four periods. Table 1.10
shows that beliefs do matter for compensation. A 10 unit increase in Letter-pairs Needed is associated with around a
$0.06 to $0.12 decrease in the amount they give to the Typing-worker depending on the specification. To further help
interpret this, suppose a manager believes the Typing task is twice as difficult as the Slider task and thus report that
30 letter-pairs are equal to 15 sliders in effort, they will give around $0.9 to $0.18 less to the Typing-worker in each
period than a manager that believes the two tasks are equally difficult. Similarly, beliefs about fairness also matter.
A 10-percentage point increase in Fair is associated with around a 0.23to0.26 increase in the amount allocated to
the Typing-worker. Furthermore, both beliefs appear to matter even when controlling simultaneously for both beliefs
(column 3).
Interestingly, while beliefs matter for manager compensation decisions, including manager beliefs as controls does
not significantly affect estimated returns to negotiation on the Typing task. Table 1.10 shows that, after controlling for
beliefs, the point-estimate for Entry is positive and significant when considering the first four periods of data. This
matches what we observed in Table 1.3. Thus, it seems unlikely that the mechanism leading to differences in returns
to negotiation could be due to Typing-workers being more effective at swaying manager beliefs than Slider-workers or
Typing-workers using this method in their negotiation more often than other workers.
Looking by gender and restricting our attention to only mixed-gender groups, we observe a similar pattern. Table
1.11 shows that a 10 unit increase in Letter-pairs Needed is associated with between a $0.06 to $0.09 cent decrease
(depending on the specification) in the amount they give to the Typing-worker. Similarly, a 10-percentage point
increase in Fair is associated with between a $0.17 to $0.20 increase in the amount they give to the Typing-worker.
Controlling for manager beliefs does not eliminate the gender difference we observe in returns to entering negotiation.
Thus, it also seems unlikely that male Typing-workers are more effective at swaying manager beliefs than female
Typing-workers.
1.5.2 Differences in Chat Style
In this subsection, we ask whether differences in chat style attenuate the gender gap in returns to negotiation. To iden-
tify chat styles, we hired four undergraduate research assistants to independently code all negotiations. We specified
ten different categories/characteristics that we felt represented the different behaviors that might arise in the negoti-
ations. These ten categories are listed in Table 1.12. Coders could select as many or as few categories that they felt
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Table 1.9: Stated Beliefs
Difference
Panel a. Manager Beliefs by Treatment Ban Negotiation (Standard Error)
Letter-pairs Needed 52.76 49.40 3.36
(3.91)
Fair Split 0.57 0.57 -0.00
(0.03)
N 42 42
Panel b. Manager Beliefs by Gender- Male Female Difference
Composition: Negotiation Treatment Typing Typing (Standard Error)
Letter-pairs Needed 50.00 48.24 1.76
(6.09)
Fair Split 0.56 0.59 -0.03
(0.04)
N 19 17
Panel c. Manager Beliefs by Gender- Male Female Difference
Composition: Ban Treatment Typing Typing (Standard Error)
Letter-pairs Needed 55.29 50.21 5.08
(6.55)
Fair Split 0.53 0.58 -0.05
(0.05)
N 17 14
Panel d. Worker Beliefs by Role: Slider- Typing- Difference
Both Treatments Worker Worker (Standard Error)
Letter-pairs Needed 60.35 48.15 12.19∗∗∗
(3.05)
Fair Split 0.51 0.61 -0.10∗∗∗
(0.02)
N 84 84
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Letter-pairs Needed is the individual’s response to a question
asking how many Letter-pairs are equal 15 Sliders worth of effort. Fair Split is the Individual’s response to a
question asking what allocation would be fair for the Typing-worker to receive given an output of 25 Sliders
and 75 Letter-Pairs.
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Table 1.10: Effect of Manager Beliefs on Typing-Worker Pay
(1) (2) (3)
# Letter-pairs 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0378∗∗∗ 0.0384∗∗∗
(0.00261) (0.00256) (0.00240)
# Sliders 0.0143∗∗ 0.0130∗∗ 0.0108
(0.00719) (0.00649) (0.00662)
Entry 0.232∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.0660) (0.0668) (0.0679)
Letter-pairs Needed -0.0121∗∗∗ -0.00579∗
(0.00350) (0.00321)
Fair Split 2.568∗∗∗ 2.266∗∗∗
(0.599) (0.595)
Constant 0.260 -1.715∗∗∗ -1.257∗∗
(0.340) (0.443) (0.526)
N 168 168 168
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered
at the group level and are shown in parentheses. Observations are restricted to
the first four periods. Results are from random effects regressions of money
given to the Typing-worker within a period in the Negotiation treatment. Entry
is a binary variable that equals one if the worker enters negotiation in the given
period. Letter-pairs Needed is the manager’s response to a survey question ask-
ing how many Letter-pairs are needed to equal 15 Sliders worth of effort. Fair
is the manager’s response to a survey question asking what allocation would
be fair for the Typing-worker to receive given an output of 25 Sliders and 75
Letter-Pairs. All regressions include period fixed effects.
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Table 1.11: Manager Beliefs on Typing-Worker Pay: Mixed-Sex
(1) (2) (3)
# Letter-pairs 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0393∗∗∗
(0.00278) (0.00244) (0.00240)
# Sliders 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗
(0.00926) (0.00827) (0.00915)
Entry 0.390∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.0968) (0.0971) (0.0982)
Female Typing-worker 0.0118 -0.0563 -0.0428
(0.147) (0.119) (0.118)
Entry X Female -0.419∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗ -0.348∗∗
Typing-worker (0.148) (0.146) (0.148)
Letter-pairs Needed -0.00945∗∗∗ -0.00581∗
(0.00303) (0.00306)
Fair Split 2.004∗∗∗ 1.740∗∗∗
(0.654) (0.630)
Constant -0.244 -1.680∗∗∗ -1.249∗∗∗
(0.377) (0.396) (0.453)
N 144 144 144
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Observations are restricted to mixed-
gender groups only and the first four periods. Standard errors are clustered at the
group level and are shown in parentheses. Results are from random effects regres-
sions of money given to the Typing-worker within a period in the Negotiation treat-
ment. Entry is a binary variable that equals one if the worker enters negotiation in
the given period. Letter-pairs Needed is the manager’s response to a survey question
asking how many Letter-pairs are needed to equal 15 Sliders worth of effort. Fair is
the manager’s response to a survey question asking what allocation would be fair for
the Typing-worker to receive given an output of 25 Sliders and 75 Letter-Pairs. All
regressions include period fixed effects.
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applied to a given negotiation. Negotiations were coded at the worker-manager level (i.e., coding for a given worker
was based on all chat interaction between that worker and the manager over the five periods of the experiment).
The coders were unfamiliar with the research questions. Coders were given a summary of the experimental in-
structions and a list of the ten categories with examples.17 Coders viewed the full set of messages sent between each
worker-manager pair, the worker’s role, and the period in which each message was sent. Given that there is not per-
fect agreement among coders, we categorize a worker as exhibiting a characteristic if at least three of the four coders
characterized them as such.
Table 1.12 provides a brief description of each category. Overall, we observe different chat characteristics exhibited
by Slider and Typing-workers in a manner that capture some of the key tensions we our design sought to create; 35%
of Typing-workers are coded as aggressive while only 9% of Slider-workers are. Workers are much more likely to
argue for the fairness norm that works in their favor. Slider-workers are much more likely than Typing-workers to
argue for merit-based fairness norms (85% versus 6%), whereas Typing-workers are much more likely than Slider-
workers to argue for output-based fairness norms (76% versus 0%). Only Typing-workers are coded as other regarding
(12% versus 0%); however, this is not surprising given that Typing-workers are in a position where it is easier to be
other-regarding. From this, we conclude that workers are using the chat feature to negotiate and that our coding of
chat data makes sense.18
1.5.3 Is the Gender Gap in Returns to Negotiation Attenuated by Differences in Negotiation Style?
In this subsection, we restrict our attention to mixed-gender pairs to analyze whether we observe differences in negoti-
ation characteristics and/or differences in returns to negotiation characteristics by worker gender and task. Table 1.13
provides a summary of the observed characteristics among workers that entered negotiation split by worker gender
and pooling over the two tasks. We find several differences in negotiation characteristics by worker gender. As we
expected, we observe that a much smaller proportion of female workers use threats when negotiating. Only 4% of fe-
male workers use a threat when negotiating; however, 24% of male workers use a threat when negotiating. Males are
more likely to argue for an even split (17% versus 4%); however, female workers are more likely to make statements
about merit (57% versus 31%). Finally, we observe no female workers using humor, but we observe 28% of male
workers using humor.
Given the large number of differences observed in negotiation characteristics between male and female workers,
we ask whether these differences attenuate the gender gap in returns to negotiation entry. To do this, in Table 1.14, we
modify our baseline regression specification (repeated in column 1 of this table) to include observed characteristics.
17We exclude the category Compromise from all analysis. When debriefing coders after they completed all tasks, it become clear that this
category was being viewed by them as a proxy for whether they observed a successful negotiation rather than representing a worker compromising
on their initial request.
18Following Cooper and Ku¨hn (2014), for each category we also calculated Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen 1960) to provide a measure of intra-coder
agreement. Using the guidelines from Landis and Koch (1977), we note that the majority of our categories have moderate to substantial agreement
between coders.
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Table 1.12: Frequency of Characteristics Among Workers that Negotiated
Slider Typing Difference
Pooled Worker Worker by Task (S.E.)
Agressive - The worker is assertive, direct, entitled, 0.23 0.09 0.35 -0.26∗∗
or aggressive (0.10)
Threat -The worker directly or indirectly threatens 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.01
to reduce their output in subsequent rounds (0.08)
Deferential - The worker talks in a non-confrontational 0.21 0.19 0.24 -0.05
manner, uses caveats, is apologetic, or is uncertain (0.10)
Even Split - The worker explicitly says joint worker 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.07
earnings should be split equally (0.07)
Merit - The worker proposes that the relative task 0.44 0.84 0.06 0.78∗∗∗
difficulty should be taken into account (0.08)
Output - The worker proposes that earnings should 0.39 0.00 0.76 -0.76∗∗∗
be based solely on output (0.08)
Humor - The worker uses humor when 0.12 0.19 0.06 0.13
negotiating with the manager (0.08)
Other-Regarding-The worker explicitly suggests the 0.06 0.00 0.12 -0.12∗∗
other worker’s well-being should be taken into account (0.06)
Off Topic - The majority of the conversation 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00
is not related to the negotiations or the task. (0.06)
N (Number of Workers) 66 32 34
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Aggressive, Threat, Deferential, Even Split, Merit,
Output, Humor, Other Regarding, and Off Topic are binary variables that each equal one if the worker was coded as exhibiting that
characteristic by at least 3 of the 4 coders.
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Table 1.13: Frequency of Characteristics Among Workers that Negotiated: Mixed Gender
Male Female Difference by
Pooled Worker Worker Gender (S.E.)
Agressive - The worker is assertive, direct, entitled, 0.23 0.21 0.25 -0.04
or aggressive (0.11)
Threat -The worker directly or indirectly threatens 0.14 0.24 0.04 0.21∗∗
to reduce their output in subsequent rounds (0.09)
Deferential - The worker talks in a non-confrontational 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.06
manner, uses caveats, is apologetic, or is uncertain (0.12)
Even Split - The worker explicitly says joint worker 0.11 0.17 0.04 0.13∗
earnings should be split equally (0.08)
Merit - The worker proposes that the relative task 0.44 0.31 0.57 -0.26∗∗
difficulty should be taken into account (0.13)
Output - The worker proposes that earnings should 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.06
be based solely on output (0.13)
Humor - The worker uses humor when 0.14 0.28 0.00 0.28∗∗∗
negotiating with the manager (0.09)
Other-Regarding-The worker explicitly suggests the 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.002
other worker’s well-being should be taken into account (0.07)
Off Topic - The majority of the conversation 0.035 0.034 0.035 -0.001
is not related to the negotiations or the task. (0.05)
N (Number of Workers) 57 29 28
Notes: ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗p< 0.01. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Observations are restricted to mixed-gender groups
only. Aggressive, Threat, Deferential, Even Split, Merit, Output, and Humor are binary variables that each equal one if the worker
was coded as exhibiting that characteristic by at least 3 of the 4 coders.
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Table 1.14: Typing-Worker Pay Controllng
for Chat Characteristics: Mixed Gender
(1) (2)
# Letter-Pairs 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗
(0.00258) (0.00288)
Sliders 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗
(0.00815) (0.00765)
Entry 0.381∗∗∗ 0.206∗
(0.0962) (0.111)
Female 0.00244 0.0288
(0.157) (0.159)
Entry X Female -0.395∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗
(0.147) (0.122)
Threat 0.693∗∗
(0.314)
Agressive 0.0825
(0.143)
Humor 0.0224
(0.244)
Deferential 0.0499
(0.134)
Output 0.00752
(0.139)
Other-Regarding -0.163
(0.269)
Constant -0.727∗∗ -0.922∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.332)
N 144 144
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Observa-
tions are restricted to first four periods and mixed-gender
groups only. Standard errors are clustered at the group
level and are shown in parentheses. Results are from ran-
dom effects regression on per-period typing worker earn-
ings. Column 1 replicates the baseline results for refer-
ence. All regressions include period fixed effects.
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We restrict our attention to characteristics in which at least 3 negotiating workers are coded as exhibiting the charac-
teristic.19 Each characteristic is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 for a given worker-period if the worker
was coded as exhibiting the characteristic and entered negotiation in that period. As shown in column 2, controlling
for negotiation characteristics return to negotiation entry for male Typing-workers by almost one-half from 38 cents
to 20 cents. The attribute that provides the largest return to negotiation is the use of threats.20 Given that we observe
only male workers using threats, one may suspect that this difference in negotiation style is what is driving the gender
gap in returns to negotiation. While we do observe that controlling for the negotiation attributes causes the gender gap
in returns to negotiation entry to decrease in size by a bit less than one-half, the gap is still sizeable and statistically
significant. This suggests that gender differences in negotiation style (such as female workers lack of using threats)
only partially attenuates the gender gap in returns to negotiation.
1.6 CONCLUSION
In recent years, some corporations have enacted Negotiation-Ban policies to combat gender differences in compen-
sation. The reasoning for enacting such policies stems from the commonly held belief that gender differences in
negotiation are one of the primary factors contributing to compensation differences. Evidence of implicit bias, how-
ever, suggests that differential treatment also can arise when management alone selects worker compensation. Previous
literature on negotiation largely focuses on studying either gender differences in entrance into negotiation and gender
differences in returns to negotiation.
This study differentiates itself from previous literature by presenting a first examination of a Negotiation-Ban
counterfactual. We investigate the manager-selected compensation that results when workers can and cannot negotiate
their salary in an environment where workers perform either high or low productivity tasks. Differentially productive
tasks make room for subjective assessment and for concerns about future productivity and increase the possibility for
implicit biases to affect compensation decisions. When negotiations are permitted we find that the more productive
task is better compensated, and that the more productive task compensation is greater for men. Thus, a gender wage
gap arises on the high productivity task. We demonstrate that this gap is not fully attenuated by gender differences in
negotiation style.
Intriguingly a Negotiation-Ban reduces the relative pay advantage of the high-productivity task, does so more
for men than for women, and reduces overall earnings inequality among workers. Thus, consistent with the recent
push to ban salary negotiations, we find that the gender gap in compensation is eliminated both on the low and high
productivity task under a Negotiation-Ban policy.
19Removing this restriction does not change the qualitative interpretations of our results. The exception is that the estimated coefficient for
Threat remains becomes less precise due to multicollinearity.
20We note that using threats as a Slider-task worker is not beneficial. Table 1.14 shows that Slider-task workers using threats instead experience
a negative return to negotiation. This is likely due to the lower bargaining power held by Slider-task workers.
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2.0 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EXECUTIVE DEPARTURE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, the U.S. has seen substantial progress in narrowing the gap in the representation and com-
pensation of women in the labor market (Bailey and DiPrete, 2016). However, a pervasive gender gap still persists at
the top of the income distribution (Guvenen et al., 2014). One area that is especially conspicuous is the gap among
top executives at publicly traded firms. A large body of research documents that women are generally paid less than
their male counterparts and are underrepresented in top management positions.1 Many explanations have been put
forth to explain the underrepresentation of women at this level. Explanations include gender differences in preferences
(e.g., fertility and family ties) and ability; discrimination and organizational barriers such as masculine work culture
and exclusion from social networks (Kark and Eagly, 2010); and, more recently, it has been argued that behavioral
differences such as differences in willingness to compete and confidence (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) as well as
differences in negotiation (Babcock and Laschever, 2003) contribute to the gap.
While these are certainly important components to the underrepresentation of women in top management positions,
they tend to focus only on differences in entry. It is not enough, however, to facilitate women’s entry; we must also
focus on their retention. A smaller set of studies focuses on exactly that (Becker-Blease et al., 2016, 2010; Gayle et al.,
2012; Guest, 2016). Overall, the results consistently demonstrate that female executives exhibit higher departure rates
than male executives. While the existing papers explore a variety of factors that may be correlated with the gender gap
in departure, none of the studies provide evidence that allows us to rule out the simplest explanation for this observed
difference: gender differences in ability.
This chapter examines whether the observed gender differences in executive departure can be explained solely
by gender differences in ability. To address this, I construct an instrument for firm performance that strips away the
ability component, use the instrument to predict departure rates, and examine whether the gender gap in departure is
correlated with the instrument.
This instrument is constructed using industry mean performance (with the own-firm removed) to instrument for
firm performance, as is done in the relative performance evaluation literature (Fee et al., 2015; Guay et al., 2014; Jenter
1See for instance Kark and Eagly (2010) or Blau and Kahn (2016) for review.
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and Kanaan, 2006, 2015), and is used to estimate the effect of firm performance on gender differences in departure
probability. Specifically, I use 2SLS to instrument for negative firm performance (as defined by having a negative
annual return) and the interaction between negative firm performance and executive gender. The excluded instruments
I use are negative firm-removed industry performance and its interaction with gender. Given that these instruments
are exogenous from executive ability within a firm, they allow for identification of whether gender differences from
departure are coming from factors outside of ability.
Using matched employer-employee data of S&P 1500 executives, and focusing primarily on industry contractions,
the results show that following a contraction, the gender gap in executive departure rates increases by around 5 per-
centage points. Further, there is no effect on the departure rate for male executives, suggesting this increase in the
departure rate gap is driven solely by an increase in female departure rates. Given a base departure rate for female
executives of 13.6%, and a gender gap, this amounts to approximately a 35% increase in the departure rate for female
executive following exogenous contractions in firm performance.
Because the gender difference in departure rates is affected by exogenous changes in firm performance, this shows
that the gender gap in executive departure cannot be explained by women’s under performance alone. As such, it is not
sufficient for policies focused on closing the gender gap in departures to simply target improving women’s leadership
skills. Instead, such policies should target the underlying mechanisms that are driving the gender gap.
Given this result, the remainder of the chapter explores alternative mechanisms and provides compelling evidence
to rule them out. Specifically examined are the following: gender differences in fertility, early retirement, external hir-
ing, the glass cliff (whereby women may be in more tenuous positions to begin with), and female start-ups. Supported
with findings from the literature, in addition to the data, it is clear that none of these potential mechanisms is likely to
be driving the observed treatment effect.
One may ask, if none of the above mechanisms are driving the effect, what could remain? One possibility that
remains consistent with the results in this study is the conjecture of gender differences in misplaced blame.2 While I
am unable to identify this mechanism with the existing data, this mechanism would also align with existing literature
that shows female executives’ pay decreases more than that for male executives following negative firm performance,
whereas the opposite pattern emerges following positive firm performance (Selody, 2010; Albanesi et al., 2015).
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: in section 2.2, I provide an overview of the executive labor market,
and discuss related literature on executive departures. In section 2.3, I discuss the data used in this study and how
variables are coded. In section 2.4, I discuss my methodology. Section 2.5 presents the main results, while section
2.6 explores potential first-order mechanisms for the observed treatment effect. In section 2.7, I discuss blame as an
alternative explanation for gender differences in departures. Finally, section 2.8 concludes.
2Examples of misplaced blame include attribution bias in which the board misattributes poor firm performance from industry shocks as being
due to ability when the executive is female. Another possibility could be self-attribution bias in which female executives more frequently misattribute
failures that are outside their control to internal factors.
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2.2 RELATED LITERATURE
2.2.1 The Executive Labor Market
Before discussing the details of the gender gap in executive departure rates, we must first define what constitutes a top
executive position. Top executives are the highest ranked executives in a company and belong to the top management
team (TMT) within the organization. As defined in (Castanias and Helfat, 1991), and in (Hambrick and Mason, 1984),
a TMT consists of the CEO, and the senior executives that report directly to the CEO. These positions are typically at
or above the level of vice president, including titles such as CFO, COO, etc.
According to Murphy (1999), the majority of top executive positions have pay packages with four distinct compo-
nents in common. These components are a minimum salary, a performance-based yearly bonus, the option to purchase
stocks at a discounted rate – which is particularly prevalent among U.S. executives, often comprising more of an in-
dividual executive’s total compensation than their minimum salary – and an incentivization scheme for encouraging
long-term performance. Furthermore, unlike typical at-will employees, who comprise the low- and mid-level ranks of
a company, top executives will usually have formalized contracts, lasting a certain number of years and stipulating the
details of the above components, as well as potential severance packages.
Given these characteristics, particularly the existence of a formalized contract with severance, these positions will
prove much more resilient to downsizing in times of economic downturn. According to Cameron et al. (1993), down-
sizing may encompass eliminating individuals or work assignments, organizational restructuring, partial dissolution,
and full dissolution of the company. As discussed in Krishnan and Park (1998), when downsizing occurs, top man-
agement teams have the tendency to replace executives perceived as underperforming, rather than simply eliminating
their positions entirely. As such, the reasons behind a top executive’s dismissal are more likely to be focused on the
perception of the difference in their ability versus the abilities of their peers than they are to be focused on the simple
redundancy of her position. This is perhaps self-evident, given that TMT positions are necessary for the operation of
a firm regardless of size. As such, they cannot easily be made redundant.
2.2.2 Executive Departure
A number of factors have been shown to affect executive departure. Most obviously, it has been documented that
executive departure is linked to the executive’s performance – e.g., Homroy (2015), Guay et al. (2014). Involuntary
departures have also been attributed to the adaptability of executives to long term industry shocks, such as changes
in the industry concentration, with generalists having lower involuntary departure following such shocks than other
executives (Guay et al., 2014).
Gender is also contributing factor to executive departure, with female executives exhibiting both higher voluntary
and involuntary departure rates (Becker-Blease et al., 2010, 2016; Gayle et al., 2012; Guest, 2016). The gender gap
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in departure rates tends to be largest in smaller firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with fewer independent
directors (Becker-Blease et al., 2010). However, the effect is not necessarily limited to such firms. In fact, the gender
difference in departure rates has significant effects on the representation and compensation of women in executive
positions (Gayle et al., 2012; Becker-Blease et al., 2016). This effect is great enough that Gayle et al. finds that the
commonly documented gender difference in executive pay can be largely explained by these differences in executive
departure.
Concordantly, researchers have been interested in exploring whether improving female representation among board
members may help reduce this departure rate gap. It is unclear, however, whether increases in female leadership helps
to attenuate the gender gap in departure rates. While some evidence suggests increased female representation on the
board of directors leads to a decrease in the gender gap in departures (Becker-Blease et al., 2010, 2016), conflicting
findings in Guest (2016) suggest that improved female leadership at the CEO or board level does not reduce the gender
gap in departure. While it is important to identify factors that may help reduce the gender gap in departures, a first
order question is whether this gap in departures can be rationalized by differences in ability alone. If the answer is
‘yes,’ then effecting organizational change to reduce female departure rates is covering the hole rather than repairing
it. Instead, research should focus on identifying factors such as systemic and institutionalized pressures which may be
impacting women’s ability.
To my knowledge, this is the first study to explore whether the observed gender differences in departure can be
fully explained by gender differences in ability. Along with addressing this, my study contributes by investigating
other, previously unexplored mechanisms that may contribute to gender differences in departure.
2.3 DATA
2.3.1 Data Overview
This study uses data from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database of the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P
SmallCap 600 companies. Execucomp is an annual dataset that is compiled by S&P Capital IQ using each included
company’s annual DEF14a proxy statement filed with the SEC. Execucomp contains compensation data on up to
fifteen of the top executives within each firm in a given year, as determined by the executives’ annual total compen-
sation.3 Commonly seen top executive officer titles within the sample include CEO, CFO, COO, President, Executive
VP, and chairman of the board. This dataset contains unique executive and firm identifiers, allowing executives to
be tracked if they move from one Execucomp company to another. In addition to providing information on annual
3DEF 14a SEC proxy statements require the firm to list the CEO, CFO, and top 3 non-CEO non-CFO executive officers (determined by total
compensations) that were employed as of the end of the fiscal year. Firms also must include up to 2 non-CEO, non-CFO executives that would have
been listed had they been employed by the end of the fiscal year. Some firms choose to report more executives than the number required by the
SEC.
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executive compensation, Execucomp provides details on executive gender, title, and age. I merge Execucomp with
Compustat data for more detailed firm level information and with data from the Center for Research in Security Prices
data for annual stock returns values, my primary measure of firm performance.
I restrict the sample to only include data from 1998 to 2015 due to the low number of female executives prior
to 1998 and incomplete data from 2016 forward. As in Selody (2010), observations with missing data or negative
observations for total compensation are dropped from the sample. Also restricted from the sample are executives with
missing age data, a reported current age below 18, missing gender data, firms that have missing data on annual stock
returns, firms with missing data on the number of employees, and all firms whose industry is classified as “other”
per the Fama-French 48 industry classifications (Fama and French, 1997). Finally, in order to identify tenure for the
executives in the sample, executives that appear as a top executive within the firm prior to 1997 are excluded. Tenure
is measured as the number of years in which an executive appears among the top executives at the firm, as defined
by the firms’ SEC proxy statement.4 Doing this allows for the identification of tenure for all executives in the sample
without incurring any left censoring of this variable. One caveat of this approach is that it creates a measure of tenure
that does not identify an executive’s overall tenure as an employee within the firm, but rather their tenure as a top
executive within the firm.
The final sample consists of 84,998 executive-firm-year observations. Within this sample, there exist 2,278 unique
firms, 19,626 unique executive-firm pairs, and 18,504 unique executives. Thus, only a small portion of executives
within the sample appear at multiple firms. Focusing on female executives, there are 6,846 executive firm-year obser-
vations with 1,805 unique female executive-firm pairs and 1,717 unique female executives. Thus, female executives
comprise approximately 8.05% of the executive-firm-year observations, 9.2% of the executive-firm pairs, and 9.3%
of the unique executive observations. The share of female executives observed in the sample is higher than the 4.5%
observed in Becker-Blease et al. (2010); however, representation of women in top executive positions has increased
over time.5 Looking instead at studies using slightly more recent data, we can see that 9% is quite comparable to that
observed in other samples using a more similar date range. For instance, Selody (2010) finds between 7 to 8% of top
executives were female between 2004 and 2008.
2.3.2 Identifying Executive Departures
While Execucomp includes some departure dates in their data, the reporting of this information was never mandatory.
Furthermore, Execucomp stopped collecting this information entirely after 2009. As a result, departure date infor-
mation in Execucomp is largely incomplete prior to 2009 and nearly non-existent following 2009 (Stefanescu et al.,
4Execucomp provides start date information for a subset of executives in the sample; however, this variable is often not reported. As a robustness
check, I repeat the primary analysis including executives with earlier start dates. The results are largely unchanged by relaxing this restriction. See
the robustness checks subsection in section 2.5.
5Focusing on my sample, only 4.6% of executives were female in 1998 compared to over 8% by 2008.
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2015).6 Thus, I construct an alternative measure of departure using the method described in Guay et al. (2014). An
executive is flagged as having departed firm f in year t (DEPART) if the following two conditions are met: they are
not listed as an executive at firm f for years t+ 1 and t+ 2; and the executive did not lose their job as a result of the
firm shutting down.
The primary goal of this study, however, is to identify which factors may be contributing to differences in invol-
untary departure rates between male and female executives. Unfortunately, identifying involuntary departures poses
its own set of challenges. Reasons behind executive departures are largely kept private, and — except under extreme
circumstances — all departure events are generally referred to as resignations, without indication as to whether they
were voluntary. Methods of coding involuntary departures in previous studies range from treating all departures as
voluntary — unless they can be identified with a specific news event — to the other extreme: coding all departures as
involuntary, unless given strong evidence to suggest otherwise. Given the sparse nature of news reports on executive
resignation events, many researchers that rely on using news reports employ some version of the Parrino (1997) al-
gorithm that dictates how to handle departure events for which no news article exists. One shortcoming of relying on
news articles to categorize turnover is that news reporters may be subject to biases, as argued in both Fee et al. (2015)
and Jenter and Lewellen (2010). In particular, Fee et al. (2015) argues that reports may be more likely to suggest a
resignation was forced when the firm performance is negative, regardless of the actual reason for departure.
Potential biases on behalf of news reporters can become even more problematic when introducing the additional
dimension of gender. For instance, a media analysis focused on news coverage of CEOs during times of transition
found that the framing of stories is much more likely to attribute blame to the CEO when she is female (The Rockefeller
Foundation and Global Strategy Group, 2016). In this instance, we have to be concerned not only with reporters having
a greater inclination to report forced resignation when firm outcomes are negative; we must also be concerned with
how any inherent gender biases on behalf of the reporters shade their news reports.
In light of potential biases that can be introduced through relying on media reports, I instead rely on a modified
method from Fee et al. (2015), in which an executive is flagged as having “involuntarily” departed (INVOLUNTARY)
if they satisfy the conditions for having departed (DEPART) and they do not reappear as a top executive at another
Execucomp firm within two years of departure.7 This measure attempts to rule out executive turnover from voluntary
job changes by executives (e.g., lateral or upwards movements). This measure is not able to rule out executives that
voluntarily leave the labor market. As such, in section 2.6 of this chapter, I explore the possibilities of fertility or
early retirement. As an additional robustness check, I also construct a measure, INVOLUNTARY2, that includes the
same restrictions as INVOLUNTARY, but does not mark as involuntarily departed the small set of executives that
Execucomp has identified as having departed due to being retired or deceased.8
6Execucomp also provides reasons for departure on the executives they flag as having departed. These categories are quite coarse; they are
limited to “deceased,” “retired,” “resigned,” and “unknown.”
7The differences between using a one year and two year restriction for reappearance are small (refer to table 2.1). Using 2 years is a slightly
more conservative definition, as it allows for any friction executives may experience in job transition and reduces the likelihood that executives
taking leave for fertility reasons will be marked as departed.
8I choose to use INVOLUNTARY instead of INVOLUNTARY2 as my main measure of departure, given the possibility for bias if the missing
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2.3.3 Firm Performance
In order to identify gender differences in executive departure that are exogenous from executive ability, I construct
an instrument for firm performance. For a given firm f , the instrument is equal to the mean performance of all firms
in firm f ’s industry with firm j removed from the average. Thus, this instrument represents the average industry
performance for firm f ’s peers defined at the industry level. Industries are defined using the Fama-French 48 industry
classification (Fama and French, 1997).
Firm performance is measured using the firm’s annual stock return as retrieved from CRSP. Stock returns are one
of the most commonly used performance measures in studies of executive compensation and departure – e.g., Becker-
Blease et al. (2010), Fee et al. (2015), Guest (2016), Jenter and Kanaan (2015). Unlike accounting-based measures,
stock returns are more unpredictable and exhibit less mean reversion. As such, when using them as a measure,
we do not need to account for lagged values in of performance in our models. Stock returns are also an attractive
performance measure because previous studies have shown that they are more predictive of executive turnover than
accounting-based measures (Fee et al., 2015; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). To adjust for the fact that stock return data
has substantial outliers, I apply a log transformation.
2.3.4 Summary Statistics
In this section, I explore the differences and similarities between the personal and firm attributes of executives by
gender. Perhaps unsurprisingly, male and female executives differ in their average age, length of tenure as an executive,
and rank within their firm as determined by relative compensation. As seen in table 2.1, male executives are older, have
longer tenure as a top executive, and are higher ranked than female executives in the sample. These results are largely
consistent with findings in previous studies – e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). Interestingly, while earlier
studies found that female executives were more likely to be employed at smaller firms (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001), I find that female executives work at slightly larger firms.9
Importantly, however, there are not striking differences by gender in firm performance. While average annual
returns seen by female executives is slightly lower than that seen by male executives, this difference is not statistically
significant, suggesting that there are not substantial differences in the success of firms within the sample that employ
male and female executives. Additionally, male and female executives do not experience different exposure rates to
industry downturns.
Turning to the different measures of departure used in this study, there is a gender gap in executive departure
as expected, given existing literature. The departure rate for female executives is approximately 3 percentage points
higher than that for male executives. While an average departure rate of around 13% may seem high, this is quite close
data on departures in Execucomp is non-random.
9In addition to controlling for the number of employees to address the gender differences I observe in firm size, in my robustness checks I run
a regression restricting the sample only to those firms that report between 4 to 6 executives in Execucomp (the most commonly observed range).
The results largely remain unchanged.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Female Mean Male Diff.
Age 54.17 57.36 3.20∗∗∗
Tenure as Top Executive (Years) 6.29 7.13 0.84∗∗∗
Rank (1 is highest) 3.80 3.19 -0.61∗∗∗
Depart (%) 0.15 0.13 -0.02∗∗∗
Involuntary (%) 0.15 0.12 -0.02∗∗∗
Involuntary2 (%) 0.14 0.11 -0.03∗∗∗
Annual Stock Return (%) 0.17 0.18 0.01
Number of Employees (Thousands) 19.69 18.46 -1.22∗
Industry Downturns (%) 0.27 0.26 -0.00
N (Executive-Firm-Year) 6848 78152
Unique Executives 1717 16787
Notes: Tenure is measured as the number of years the executive is listed as a top executive at the firm.
Rank is the executives relative rank within the firm as determined by total compensation. An executive is
listed as having departed in a given year if they do not return to the firm for two consecutive years. An
executive is listed as Involuntary in a given year if they satisfy the criteria for depart and do not reappear
at any Execucomp firm within two years. An executive is listed as Involuntary2 in a given year if they
satisy the criteria for Involuntary and they are not marked as retired or deceased. * p < .10, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01.
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to other studies that look at CEO or executive departure. For instance, Jenter and Kanaan (2015) finds an annual CEO
departure rate of 10.25% in their 1993-2009 sample; Guay et al. (2014) finds an annual CEO departure rate of 12% in
their 1992 to 2008 sample; and Fee et al. (2015) finds an 11% annual CEO departure rate in their 1991-2007 sample.
Keeping in mind that non-CEO executive departure rates tend to be somewhat higher than CEO departure rates, an
average departure rate of 13% for top executives seems consistent with earlier studies.10
The difference in DEPART and INVOLUNTARY gives the unconditional reappearance rate for executives in the
sample. The fact that this value is 1% suggests that only a small portion of the executives in the sample that depart
reappear again at another Execucomp firm.11 In fact, conditional on having departed, only around 7% of executives
secure a new position with an Execucomp firm within two years of departure. While a conditional reappearance rate of
7% (or an unconditional reappearance rate of 1%) seems quite low, this is consistent with findings in existing studies.
Gayle et al. (2012) finds an unconditional reappearance rate of 2% among top executives, while Fee et al. (2015) finds
the CEO reappearance rate as a top executive conditional on having departed is 5.46%.
2.4 METHODOLOGY
Before discussing the details of the gender gap in executive departure rates, we must first define what constitutes a top
executive position. Top executives are the highest ranked executives in a company and belong to the top management
team (TMT) within the organization. As defined in (Castanias and Helfat, 1991), and in (Hambrick and Mason, 1984),
a TMT consists of the CEO, and the senior executives that report directly to the CEO. These positions are typically at
or above the level of vice president, including titles such as CFO, COO, etc. Unlike low-ranked employees and even
middle management that can be downsized and their work reassigned to other employees, top executive positions are
not disposable or interchangeable in the same sense. As such, dismissal decisions of TMT executives are unlikely to
be due to cost-cutting by the board and are instead based on observed performance of top executives, as measured via
firm performance.
Therefore, one method to identify whether the observed gender differences in executive departure are coming
solely from differences in ability, is to strip away the ability component of firm performance and see if the exogenous
portion of firm performance is still correlated with the departure of executives. To do this, I rely on the empirical
framework created by the relative performance evaluation literature — i.e., Holmstro¨m (1982), Jensen and Murphy
(1990), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Jenter and Kanaan (2006).12
10This study’s departure rates are not comparable to Becker-Blease et al. (2010) due to the fact that they did not account for the missing departure
data in Execucomp and thus only looked at Execucomp reported departures.
11There are no significant gender differences in the likelihood of reappearing at another Execucomp firm conditional on having departed. 7% of
departing male executives reappear and 6.2% of departing female executives reappear. These differences are not significant according to a two-sided
t-test (p=0.29).
12Under the relative performance evaluation (RPE) theory, optimal incentive schemes should depend only on the ability and/or actions of
executives; any variation in industry level performance should be filtered out, and thus should not affect incentives. Papers focused on testing RPE
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Suppose that the performance for firm f , yf , is a function of the firm’s ability (and thus the top management team’s
ability) af , a firm-specific noise parameter uf , and an industry wide noise parameter o, represented as follows.
yf = af + o+ uf
If ability is the only factor leading to gender differences in departure, variation in firm performance that occurs at
the industry level (i.e., variations in o) are exogenous from ability for any given executive within the firm and thus
should not lead to different performance evaluations for male versus female executives. In other words, industry
performance (with the own-firm removed) should be orthogonal to the interaction between gender and involuntary
executive departure within a firm. Note that this method relies on the assumption that the firm’s actions do not affect
the performance of industry peers; Jenter and Kanaan (2015) uses the same data set that I do and finds that this
assumption holds.13
Given that we see a higher departure rate among female executives, I am especially interested in what happens
to the gender difference in departures following contractions firm performance. Looking at the relationship between
departures and a continuous measure of exogenous performance interacted with gender will show whether there is
a stronger relationship between exogenous performance and departures for females versus males. This measure will
not, however, directly show whether there are higher departures for females relative to males as a result of negative
exogenous changes in performance. As such, much of the analysis in this study focuses on the relationship between
departures and a binary measure of exogenous performance. By allowing the binary measure of performance to equal
one only when the annual return is negative, it is possible to identify whether we specifically observe an increase in
the gender difference in departure rates following industry contractions.
I focus on this measure because the change from an increase in annual stock value to a decrease relative to the
prior year is a rather natural and salient cut-off. A large literature within pyschology and behavioral economics
on loss aversion demonstrates that the disutility individuals experience from a loss is typically larger than the utility
experience from an equally sized gain.14. As such, boards and investors may be more responsive to losses in firm value
(as evidenced by a negative annual stock return) than gains. For robustness, I later consider an alternative definition of
a negative shock to be instances where predicted firm performance is below the average industry mean performance
across all years in the sample. This alternative definition can be motivated by a reference-dependence utility model
in which the reference point is based on expectations about performance (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). I show that the
economic and statistical significance persists under this alternate specification.
construct instruments for firm performance that are exogenous from ability and look at how changes in instrumented firm performance affect various
measures of executive incentives (e.g., bonuses, dismissals, etc.).
13The authors argue that were a firm’s actions to affect the performance of industry peers, then the returns to industry performance for that firm
should differ from returns for a firm that does not affect industry peer performance. Small firms within an industry are least likely to have an effect
on the performance of industry peers whereas large firms are most likely to affect industry peer performance. Jenter and Kanaan (2015 shows that
there is no difference to the returns for large versus small firms within an industry. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) also provides evidence in
favor of this assumption.
14Loss aversion was first introduced in seminal work by Kahneman and Tversky(1979). For a recent review of the loss aversion literature see
DellaVigna(2009) or Marzilli Ericson and Fuster(2014)
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More formally, I estimate departure probability for a given excutive at a firm within a year as a function of the
executive’s gender, an indicator for whether firm perfornace is negative, the interation between gender and an indicator
for negative performance, and additional controls. Letting i represent executives, f represent firms, d industries, and t
years, the estimating equaltion can be defined as follows.
departi,f,t = β0 + β1NEGf,t + β2Fi + β3NEGf,t × Fi + θXi,f ,t + δt + ϕd + i,f,t
Fi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the executive is female, NEGf,t is a dummy variable that equals 1
when the firm’s annual return is negative, andXi,f ,t is a vector of controls for executive i at time t.15 Standard errors
are clustered at the industry level to account for the fact that performance is highly correlated across firms within a
given industry. If gender differences in departure stem solely from differences in ability, we should find β3 = 0. If,
however, β3 6= 0, then the gender difference in executive departures is at least partially coming from a factor other
than gender differences in ability.
Because firm performance is a function of both executive ability and exogenous factors, I instrument for negative
firm performance using an indicator for when own-firm-removed industry performance is negative. As is standard
when dealing with an interation between an exogenous variable (Gender) and an endogenous variable (negative firm
performance), I use the interaction between the exogenous variable and the instrument for the endogenous variable as
an instrument for the interaction term. That is, I use the interaction between gender and an indicator for when own-
firm-removed industry performance is negative to instrument for the interaction between gender and negaative firm
performance. More formally, for a given firm f in year t with n firms in the industry let own-firm-removed industry
performance for firm f , performanceIndustryf,t be defined as follows:
performanceIndustryf,t =
1
n− 1
∑
j∈Industyf,ts.t.j 6=f
performancej,t
From this definition, 1{performanceIndustryf,t < 0} is used as an instrument for NEGf,t and its interaction with
executive gender is used as an instrument for NEGf,t × Fi. Although the endogenous variables used are both binary
treatment variables, I employ a garden variety 2SLS methodology. This is the reccomended course of action suggested
by Angrist (2009).
15Controls include the number of employees within the firm, the executive’s rank in the firm as determined using the executive’s annual com-
pensation relative to the other top executives within the firm, tenure as a top executive within the firm, and age. I include time fixed effects and
industry fixed effects in all specifications except those without controls.
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2.5 RESULTS
2.5.1 Main Result
Before discussing the main regression output, I first look at Figure 2.1, which plots the relationship between predicted
firm performance (as computed using the first stage regression) and my preferred measure of executive resignations
that excludes executives who move to new firms (i.e. INVOLUNTARY). This figure shows that, while departure rates
increase for both male and female executives when firm performance is predicted to be negative, males only experience
a 1.3 percentage point increase in departure whereas females experience a 3.8 percentage point increase in departure.
Although this figure is suggestive of female executives having a higher likelihood of departure as a result of industry
contractions, it does not control for any differences in executive characteristics or firm characteristics. Thus, to better
understand the effect of industry contractions on gender differences in executive departure, we need to turn to our
second stage regression results.
Figure 2.1: Departure by Gender and Exogenous Performance
Table 2.2 presents the results from a 2SLS regression in which I instrument for negative firm performance and its
interaction with gender. The first three columns report results from the second stage regression using my preferred
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measure of departure as the dependent variable. Across these three columns, regardless of whether we have neither
controls nor fixed effects, only fixed effects, or both controls and fixed effects, the estimated gender gap in depar-
ture following downturns (measured by Negative X Female) remains quite stable.16 Furthermore, the remaining two
columns report results using my alternate two measures of departure. For all three measures of departure, female
executives are predicted to have a higher overall resignation rate than male executives following industry downturns.
We can also see that overall departure rates for female executives are positive and significant. This matches what is
shown in Figure 2.1.
Focusing now on my preferred measure of departure and specification in column 3, the estimated coefficients sug-
gest that overall resignation rates for female executives are similar to that for male executives. When firm performance
is negative however, the resignation probability of female executives increases by around 5 percentage points more
than male executives. Recall from table 2.1 that, as measured by INVOLUNTARY, the average departure rate for
female executives is 15%. Thus, the estimated increase in departure rates of female executives during contractions is
both statistically significant and economically significant.
Recall, INVOLUNTARY does not code as departed those executives that leave their job and move to another
Execucomp firm; INVOLUNTARY2 includes the same restrictions as INVOLUNTARY, but does not code as departed
those executives that Execucomp flags as being retired or deceased. Thus, INVOLUNTARY2 is a tighter definition
of departures. In contrast, DEPART codes all executives that leave their job as departed. Thus, DEPART is a looser
measure of departure than INVOLUNTARY. Looking across column 4 and column 5 of Table 2.2, the estimated
treatment effect decreases in magnitude under the looser measure of departure and increases in magnitude under the
tighter measures of departure. This suggests that the increase in female departure rates does not appear to be being
driven by voluntary job changes. I am not, however, unable to rule out other voluntary explanations for the increase
in departures (such as leaving the market to become a stay-at-home mom). I explore these alternative explanations in
more detail in section 2.6.
Regardless of whether the increase in the gender gap in departures following exogenous decreases in firm per-
formance is being driven by voluntary or involuntary departures, the fact that we see the gender gap in departures
increasing following an exogenous change in firm performance allows us to conclude that the gender gap in departures
is not driven solely by gender differences in ability. In section 2.6, I will discuss potential mechanisms that may be
driving this effect. For the remaining discussion, unless stated otherwise, I will focus on my preferred measure of
departure, INVOLUNTARY.
16Interestingly, the same is not true for male executives. While the male departure rate is predicted to increase following downturns in column
1, this effect is no longer significant after adding year and industry fixed effects. One potential interpretation for this is that male executives
experience increased rates of departures following overall recessions; however, they do not experience increased departure rates from industry-
specific downturns.
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Table 2.2: Departure Probability:
Results of Second-Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Involuntary Involuntary Involuntary Depart Involuntary2
Negative 0.023∗∗∗ 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.021
(0.005) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018)
Negative X Female 0.050∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Female 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
N 84998 84998 84998 84998 84998
Notes: Performance is the predicted log annual stock return from the first stage regression using mean industry
performance with the own-firm removed. Negative is a dummy variable that equals 1 when predicted performance is
negative. Controls include executive age, rank, tenure, and number of employees. Robust standard errors (clustered
at the industry level) are reported in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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2.5.2 Robustness Checks
I conduct a number of robustness checks in which I vary the specification, the sample restrictions, and check for
omitted variable bias. Overall, the results are largely unchanged. In this subsection, I briefly discuss the robustness
checks conducted and their findings.
The main specification in this study only allows for a discrete jump in departure rates following negative firm
performance. One question is whether the results will change if an interaction between the continuous measure of
performance and gender is included. Table 2.3 presents results from this specification and shows that the relationship
is indeed stronger for female executives and in order for positive annual returns to counteract the fact that female
executive departure rates are predicted to be higher than that for males, the exogenous portion of log annual return
would need to exceed a value of 1.
One potential concern is that the estimated treatment effect is being driven solely by differences near the discon-
tinuity. Ideally, the observed increase in the gender gap in departure should hold even when we move away from this
discontinuity point. To address this concern, I estimate the second stage regression excluding observations in a narrow
band around the discontinuity. Columns 2 through 4 of Table 2.4 present results that exclude all observations in which
firm performance is within 0.025, 0.05, and 0.075 of 0. In doing this, the results are largely unchanged. A related
concern is that, while zero is a natural and salient cut-off to use when defining negative performance, other cut-offs
may also be worth considering. Column 5 presents results from a regression that redefines a negative shock to being
instances in which performance is below historic mean returns. In other words, the cutoff is moved from being at zero
to being at the overall mean historic return. While the treatment effect decreases some in magnitude, it remains both
economically and statistically significant. This suggests that the results are not being driven only by large differences
around the discontinuity nor are they being driven by the choice of cut-off.
Concerns may also arise regarding sample restrictions. Recall that in the primary specification, executives that
have a start year as an executive that is before 1997 are excluded from the sample. Column 2 of table 2.5 shows that
after relaxing this assumption, the effect remains economically and statistically significant. As an additional test, recall
that there exist some gender differences in firm size and that the number of reported executives varies some by firm.
One concern stemming from this is that there may be differences in the firing behavior of large versus small firms that
are driving the treatment effect. To address this, column 3 of Table2. 5 shows that that the primary treatment effect
persists even when the sample is restricted to only include firms that report between 4 to 6 executives (the range into
which most firms fall).
Finally, I check for selection on unobservables stemming from omitted variables. Execucomp does not provide
information on the background of executives. To address this, I first compare the primary regression to one without
controls. Adding controls does not have a large effect on the estimated treatment effect. To more rigorously test for
the robustness of the results, I use the method detailed in Oster (2016) to test how much variation in departures would
need to be explained by unobservables in order to reduce the treatment effect to zero. The standard rule of thumb is to
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Table 2.3: Departure Probability with
Continuous Performance Measures:
Results of Second-Stage Regression
(1)
Performance -0.009
(0.012)
Performance X Female -0.029∗
(0.017)
Female 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005)
Year FE Yes
Industry FE Yes
Controls Yes
N 84998
Notes: Performance is the predicted log annual
stock return from the first stage regression using
mean industry performance with the own-firm
removed. Controls include executive age, rank,
tenure, and number of employees. Robust stan-
dard errors (clustered at the industry level) are
reported in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01.
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Table 2.4: Sensitivity of Departure Probability to Measure of Industry Shocks:
Results of Second Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Exclude Exclude Exclude Alternate
+/-.025 +/-.05 +/-.075 Cut-Off
Negative 0.018 0.023 0.025 0.028
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Negative X Female 0.050∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.040∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Female 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Below Average 0.007
(0.014)
Below Average X Female 0.032∗
(0.017)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 84998 80343 75789 71452 84998
Notes: Performance is the predicted log annual stock return from the first stage regression using mean in-
dustry performance with the own-firm removed. Columns 2 through 4 exclude observations with predicted
performance in the specificed interval around 0. Column 5 reports results from a regression in which the
definition of a negative shock is changed to be instances in which predicted performance is below the over-
all industry mean performance with the own-firm removed. Negative is a dummy variable that equals 1
when predicted performance is negative. Below Average is a dummy variable that equals 1 when predicted
performance is below the overall industry mean performance with the own-firm removed. Controls include
executive age, rank, tenure, and number of employees. Robust standard errors (clustered at the industry
level) are reported in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
53
Table 2.5: Additional Robustness Tests: Results of
Second-Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Include Firms with
Pre-1997 4-6 Executives
Negative 0.018 0.021∗ 0.000
(0.018) (0.011) (0.017)
Negative X Female 0.050∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020)
Female 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 84998 118982 72653
Notes: Performance is the predicted log annual stock return from the first stage
regression. Negative is a dummy variable that equals 1 when predicted perfor-
mance is negative. Controls include executive age, rank, tenure, and number of
employees. Robust standard errors (clustered at the industry level) are reported
in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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carry out this estimation with the assumption that the maximum possible R-squared (if all unobservables are included)
is 1.3 times the R-squared observed in the regression with controls. Using this rule of thumb, estimates suggest that
unobservables would need to explain over 160 times more variation in departures than observables in order to render
the treatment effect null. As a more conservative test, I repeat the Oster test but instead assume the maximum possible
R-squared is 1. Using this maximum R-squared, unobservables would need to explain 4.74 times more variation in
departures than observables. Given that the standard cutoff for this test is 1, I can confidently reject the hypothesis that
the treatment effect is being driven by omitted variable bias.
2.6 MECHANISMS
So far, I have demonstrated that the gender gap in executive departure increases following industry downturns, and that
this increase is driven solely by a change in the departure rate of female executives. Given that industry performance
is exogenous from executive ability, the data suggest that this increase is not due to gender differences in ability.
This section discusses alternative explanations for the observed treatment effect. Given that the measure of de-
partures used cannot rule out voluntary departure from the market of Execucomp firms, I first test whether fertility
preferences or early retirement can explain the increases in gender gap in departures following industry contractions.
Neither fertility nor early retirement appear to explain this increase. Next, I consider whether differences in hiring
conditions might account for the increased rate of female departures and demonstrate that this also does not appear
to be driving the observed effect. The subsequent section then discusses differences in attribution bias or blame as a
plausible remaining explanation.
2.6.1 Fertility
In order to consider the total effect industry contractions may have on fertility behavior of female executives, we
must separately consider the substitution and income effect. An industry-wide contraction will likely affect existing
female executives’ pay through reduced bonuses, as well as reduced stock values. This reduction in pay will reduce
the relative cost of leaving the industry for child-rearing purposes and thus, via the substitution effect, executives will
shift away from work and towards child-rearing. However, the decrease in pay will also reduce the overall income of
executives and thus, via the income effect, will cause executives to work relatively more. Depending on whether the
income or substitution effect dominates, we could see industry contractions increase, decrease, or not change the rate
of departure for fertility reasons of female executives.
Looking at the relationship between the overall labor market and economic fluctuations, it seems unlikely that
we would see an increase in fertility decisions by executives during industry contractions. Overwhelmingly, studies
focused on the relationship between business cycles and fertility find that fertility rates decrease during recessions
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and are thus pro-cyclical (refer to Jones and Schoonbroodt (2016), Schneider (2015) for studies using recent data, and
Sobotka et al. (2011) for an extensive survey of earlier studies). Furthermore, Schaller (2016) finds that the substitution
effect is weakest among high-skilled women, suggesting that fertility rates should decline most among these women
during economic contractions. Thus, in order for fertility to explain the increase in female executive departure rates
during industry contractions, female executives would need to differ substantially from not only the average female
worker, but also from the average high-skilled female worker.
The data provides further evidence against fertility being the primary mechanism behind the observed gender
difference in departure rates. If female executives depart more for fertility reasons during economic contractions,
then there should be a significant decrease in the magnitude and significance of the treatment effect when the sample
is restricted to exclude younger executives that are more likely to be making fertility decisions. Table 2.6 presents
results when the sample is restricted to executives over the age of 40 (column 2), over the age of 45 (column 3), and
over the average menopausal age of 51 (column 4). Contrary to what one would expect if economic contractions are
leading women to become stay-at-home moms, the effect of downturns on female executive departure remains both
economically and statistically significant.
As additional tests for fertility as a mechanism, I explore the overall trends for executives by gender at the market
level and look at what happens around the two recessions observed in the sample (2001 and 2007-2009). If fertility is
driving the increase in departures during downturns, then the share of entrants that are women should decrease during
recessions, as women move away from the labor market for fertility. Figure 2.2 shows that this is not occurring and that,
if anything, the share of female entrants increased during the recessions. One may also expect to see the age of female
entrants increase during recessions as younger women choose not to enter the market for fertility reasons; however,
as Figure 2.3 demonstrates, there is not a consistent relationship between the change in the age of female entrants
across the two observed recessions. Finally, the average age of departing female executives decline during recessions
if women in their fertile years leave the labor market. Figure 2.4 shows that there is no consistent relationship between
the age of departing or non-departing female executives and recessions.
Overall, the data do not provide any evidence that is consistent with the fertility mechanism driving the treatment
effect. Given the lack of evidence in favor of the fertility mechanism, in combination with the fact that existing
literature suggests fertility is pro-cyclical, fertility does not appear to be the main factor driving increased female
departure during industry downturns.
2.6.2 Early Retirement
Another possibility is that the observed increase in female departure rates following downturns is coming from early
retirement by female executives. As with fertility, we need to consider both the income and substitution effects of
industry downturns. While industry downturns will reduce the relative price of early retirement (as discussed in the
fertility section), they also reduce the overall income of executives. In order to be the mechanism driving increased
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Table 2.6: Subsample Analysis using Older Executives:
Results of Second Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Age > 40 Age > 45 Age > 51
Negative 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.022
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025)
Negative X Female 0.050∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031)
Female 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 84998 82643 75415 56500
Notes: Performance is the predicted log annual stock return from the first stage regression
using mean industry performance with the own-firm removed. Negative is a dummy vari-
able that equals 1 when predicted performance is negative. Controls include executive age,
rank, tenure, and number of employees. Robust standard errors (clustered at the industry
level) are reported in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of Female Entrants by Year
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Figure 2.3: Average Age of Entrants by Year and Gender
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Figure 2.4: Average Age of Executives by Year, Gender, and Departure Status
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female departures for during downturns, it would need to be the case that the substitution effect dominates the income
effect for female executives at retirement age, but not for male executives at retirement age. Furthermore, pension
payments for CEOs and top executives are based on pay around the point of retirement. Liebersohn (2016) shows that
executives take this into account when timing their retirements and, as a result, retirement among executives is lower
during economic contractions relative to expansions.
Despite the fact that early retirement does not appear to be a likely explanation for the observed treatment effect
given the results in Liebersohn (2016), I investigate it in more detail via subsample analysis and observation of trends
for executives by gender at the market level. As a first step, I consider what happens to the gender gap in departures
following downturns when I restrict the sample to executives below retirement ages. If early retirement is the mech-
anism driving increased female departures following downturns, the treatment effect should be reduced in magnitude
and significance. As Table 2.7 shows, this does not occur. Restricting the sample to executives below the classic
retirement age of 65 or the younger age of 60, we see that the treatment effect persists, suggesting early retirement is
not the mechanism driving the increased gender gap in executive departures.
To provide additional evidence against the early retirement mechanism, recall that we did not see any systematic
relationship between executive age and recessions (Figure 3 and Figure 4). Thus, there is no evidence that early
retirement is driving the increase in female departure rates during downturns.
2.6.3 Glass Cliff
Another possible explanation for the gender differences in executive departure during downturns is the glass cliff. This
term was first introduced in Ryan and Haslam (2005), in response to an article in The Times, which suggested that
female leaders negatively affect firm performance. Ryan and Haslam refute this claim and argue that women are more
likely to be appointed into leadership positions during times of market contractions when firm performance relative to
other firms is poor. Thus, female leaders have a higher likelihood of being appointed to more tenuous positions. Ryan
and Haslam refer to this phenomenon as the glass cliff.17
While several studies have found evidence of the glass cliff phenomenon (e.g., Kulich et al. (2015); Mulcahy and
Linehan (2014); Haslam and Ryan (2008)), there is also evidence suggesting that it may not persist in all settings and
may be dependent on the sampling population and definition of “crisis” within a firm (Adams et al., 2009; Cook and
Glass, 2014; Hennessey et al., 2014). Furthermore, much of the research on the glass cliff phenomenon focuses on
female board members and CEOs. Thus, while it is possible the glass cliff is contributing to the gender differences in
departure, it is also possible that the glass cliff is not a strong presence within the population of all top executives at
publicly traded US firms.
To explore whether the glass cliff is driving the increase in departure probability of female executives during
17Reasons for the glass cliff phenomenon include a desire to signal change to investors (Kulich et al., 2015), selection bias (Haslam and Ryan,
2008), and implicit stereotypes that female executives are better in times of crisis – also known as, “think crisis – think female” (Ryan et al., 2011).
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Table 2.7: Subsample Analysis using Younger Executives:
Results of Second Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Age < 65 Age < 60
Negative 0.018 0.017 0.015
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Negative X Female 0.050∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019)
Female 0.003 0.000 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 84998 73608 60443
Notes: Performance is the predicted log annual stock return from the first
stage regression using mean industry performance with the own-firm re-
moved. Negative is a dummy variable that equals 1 when predicted per-
formance is negative. Controls include executive age, rank, tenure, and
number of employees. Robust standard errors (clustered at the industry
level) are reported in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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downturns, I restrict my attention to the subsample of executives that were hired when firms were doing better than
their industry peers (i.e., when the residual from the first stage regression is positive), and also to the subsample of
executives that were hired when firms were doing better than their industry peers for two consecutive years. These
subsamples represent the set of executives that are least likely to be glass cliff hires for females, and thus we should
no longer observe the treatment effect if the glass cliff is driving the results. Table 2.8 shows that this is not the case.
Even among the set of executives hired in firms that are doing relatively well, female executives’ departure probability
increases during downturns.
As a secondary test of whether the glass cliff hypothesis is driving the treatment effect, I consider a subsample
of executives with longer tenure. Given that glass cliff executives are hired into more tenuous positions, one may
expect that their expected tenure is much shorter than that of non-glass cliff hires. As such, the effect of industry
downturns on female departures should be weaker among executives with longer tenure. This subsample analysis is
slightly trickier to interpret, because executives with longer tenure are already, through selection, likely to be of better
quality, and thus less sensitive to shocks. Regardless, focusing on Table 2.9, it only after the sample nearly in half – by
restricting our attention to executives with more than 3 years of tenure – that the treatment effect declines in magnitude
and significance. One would imagine that, if the glass cliff was the driving mechanism behind the increased departure
rate of female executives during downturns, we would see the estimated treatment effect with a much earlier tenure
restriction. Thus, the results from Table 2.9 also provide evidence against the glass cliff hypothesis.
Taking the results from Table 2.8 and the results from Table 2.9, the glass cliff hypothesis does not appear to be
the mechanism behind the treatment effect. Thus, while female executives may be more likely to be hired into already
tenuous positions, even those female executives hired into less tenuous positions experience an increase in departure
probability following industry downturns. This suggests that regardless of whether female executives face a glass cliff
or a solid ledge (Hennessey et al., 2014), both experience a precipitous drop when the ground starts to shake.
2.6.4 External Hires
There exists some evidence that, conditional on being appointed to a CEO position, females are more likely to come
from an external appointment than males. In a sample of CEOs from 2004 to 2015, 77% of male appointments were
internal, whereas only 68% of female appointments were internal (Study, 2016). Expanding to the set of all top
executives, however, the picture is less clear. Quintana-Garcı´a and Elvira (2017) finds that, in a sample of technology
firms, female executives are actually less likely to be externally hired than male executives. In contrast, Fernandez-
Mateo and Fernandez (2016) finds that, in a proprietary sample of firms that rely partially on an external hiring agent,
female executives are more likely to be externally hired. One could expect that this may lead to those executives
having weaker internal networks and thus being more exposed to exogenous declines in firm performance.
There is mixed evidence on whether being externally hired is detrimental to executive success. While on the
one hand, externally hired executives tend to experience higher starting compensation than internal hires (Bidwell,
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Table 2.8: Subsample Analysis using Executives Hired when Firm is
Performing Well Relative to Peers: Results of Second-Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Industry-Adjusted Industry-Adjusted
Return Positive Return Positive
when Hired when Hired
and Prior Year
Negative 0.018 0.040∗∗ 0.050∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.028)
Negative X Female 0.050∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(0.020) (0.026) (0.031)
Female 0.003 -0.010 -0.014∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 84998 51376 35111
Notes: Performance is the predicted log annual stock return from the first stage regression using
mean industry performance with the own-firm removed. Negative is a dummy variable that
equals 1 when predicted performance is negative. Controls include executive age, rank, tenure,
and number of employees. Robust standard errors (clustered at the industry level) are reported
in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table 2.9: Subsample Analysis using Executives with More Tenure:
Results of Second-Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Tenure > 1 year Tenure > 2 years Tenure > 3 years
Negative 0.018 0.027 0.018 0.020
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022)
Negative X Female 0.050∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.041∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Female 0.003 -0.006 -0.013 -0.004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 84998 71472 58579 45310
Notes: Performance is the predicted log annual stock return from the first stage regression using mean industry
performance with the own-firm removed. Negative is a dummy variable that equals 1 when predicted performance is
negative. Controls include executive age, rank, tenure, and number of employees. Robust standard errors (clustered at
the industry level) are reported in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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2011), this benefit is generally limited to males (Brett and Stroh, 1997; Dreher et al., 2011). In fact, Quintana-Garcı´a
and Elvira (2017) argues that externally hired female executives may fare worse with respect to compensation than
internally hired female executives due to more discretion in pay setting for external hires. It is unclear, however, to
what extent the results in Quintana-Garcı´a and Elvira (2017) will generalize to executive departure, given that the
disadvantage they find for female external hires stems from gender differences in pay-setting behavior.
Focusing more narrowly on departures, neither Dikolli et al. (2014) nor Yonker (2016) find a significant relation-
ship between being externally hired and departure probability. In contrast, Guay et al. (2014) finds that externally hired
CEOs experience higher overall involuntary departure; importantly, however, this study also finds that externally hired
CEOs are less likely to involuntarily depart following exogenous industry shocks. Thus, if anything, being externally
hired would suggest a decrease in the departure probability following industry downturns.
Considering the overall literature on gender differences in external hire rates and the literature on the impact of
being externally hired on labor market outcomes, it seems unlikely that differences in external hiring could be driving
the gender differences in departure rates. Specifically, it is unclear whether, when considering all top executives, there
exists a gender difference in external hire probabilities. It also appears that, even conditional on being an external hire,
negative exogenous shocks to firm performance should at worst have no effect on the departure rates of external hires.
Unfortunately, identifying internal versus external hires in the sample is difficult. For many executives within the
sample, there is missing information on when they first joined their company.18 Importantly, however, looking at
executives fin the sample for whom I do have information on their join year, I do not observe an overall difference
between male and female executives in the likelihood of being an external hire; 55.4% of males are externally hired
whereas 53.7% of females are externally hired.19 Thus, taking this in conjunction with the existing literature, this
seems to be an unlikely mechanism for the observed treatment effect.
2.6.5 Female Start-Ups
One may also think a factor driving the observed treatment effect is a preponderance of female executives leaving their
current positions to create their own startups during downturns. The argument would be that, due to the downturn, their
salaries, pensions, and other perquisites are smaller, and the opportunity cost of leaving their current job is therefore
reduced. However, in order for this explanation to be likely, the substitution effect of leaving one’s job during a
downturn to pursue a startup would have to outweigh the income effect of the downturn. Furthermore, (Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation, 2017) finds no evidence of a higher number of female-created startups during recessions relative
to the number of male-created startups. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the treatment effect is being driven by female
executives leaving their positions to create startups during downturns.20
18Within the sample, this information is missing for 71.9% of the executives and is missing more often for female executives (76.4%) than male
executives (71.5%).
19I observe a higher share of being externally hired for female CEOs that closely matches the Study (2016).
20One may also be tempted to think that the increased departure rates for female executives during downturns could be attributed to gender
differences in the size of golden parachutes – the pension and severance payments top executives receive upon termination. This relies on the
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2.7 MISPLACED BLAME
If the increase in departure rates among female executives following downturns is not due to differences in leadership
ability, fertility, retirement, the glass cliff, or differences in external hire rates, what could explain this treatment
effect? One remaining explanation that is consistent with the results presented within this study, and supported by
related findings within the literature on gender differences in labor market outcomes, is misplaced blame.
It may be the case that boards incorrectly attribute poor firm performance to executive ability when the executive is
female. In other words, it is possible boards may have a higher likelihood of committing fundamental attribution errors
when performance is poor and the executive in question is female.21 Misplaced blame could also manifest not as the
result of attribution bias from the board, but rather via female executives being held to different performance standards
(and thus punished more readily) relative to male executives. This could lead to female executives being blamed for
outcomes they could not reasonably have control over or have foreseen. It may also be that the misplaced blame does
not stem directly from the board, but could instead stem from CEO’s being more likely to use female executives below
them as scapegoats for poor performance. When considering the latter possibility, it is relevant to refer to the findings
discussed in Finkelstein et al. (2009) that suggest performance does not provide a complete explanation for executive
turnover. Indeed, Finkelstein et al. (2009) conclude powerful but underperforming CEOs will shift blame to their
TMT executives, resulting in the replacement of those executives rather than the CEO. This behavior may also extend
to gender whereby female executives may be blamed more often than males.
There are existing results that provide some evidence in support of women more frequently receiving misplaced
blame. Selody (2010) and Albanesi et al. (2015) demonstrate that female executives’ pay decreases more following
negative changes in firm performance than does the pay for male executives, whereas male executive pay increases
more than female pay following positive changes in firm performance. Selody (2010) further documents that male
executives’ bonuses increase more following exogenous increases in firm outcomes than do bonuses for female ex-
ecutives. Not only has research documented gender asymmetries in the extent to which executives are penalized or
rewarded for their performance, there is also recent evidence documenting how women may be more harshly pun-
ished for blatant misconduct. Looking at financial advisors instead of executives, Egan et al. (2017) finds that women
are more likely to be terminated for misconduct than men, despite the fact that women are less likely to engage in
misconduct and are less likely to be repeat offenders. These results suggest that male and female employees receive
differential treatment for successes and failures.
It is also possible that the differences in blame may not stem from the board or CEO, but may instead be due to
gender differences in self-attribution bias. Experimental economics literature has not found gender differences in the
argument that the board would choose to eliminate an executive’s position as a cost-cutting measure during downturns. However, as discussed
previously, unlike other positions, TMT are unlikely to be made redundant. As such, it is unclear what benefit firing an existing executive simply to
replace them would serve.
21Existing literature on attribution bias has demonstrated this phenomenon with respect to perceived leaders whereby individuals exhibit ten-
dencies to over-attribute the role of the leader in both positive and negative exogenous outcomes (Weber et al., 2001). Attribution bias may also
manifest more in bad times and more often among outsiders (such as among women in top corporate roles during downturns) (Selody, 2010).
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direction of asymmetric updating within ego-relevant tasks – e.g., Eil and Rao (2011), Ertac (2011), Mo¨bius et al.
(2014). However, looking instead to the psychology literature, several studies show women are more likely to attribute
failure to internal factors and success to external factors, while men behave in the opposite manner – e.g., Deaux
(1979), Deaux and Emswiller (1974). This difference in self-attribution behavior may cause female executives to take
the blame for failures that are outside of their control, and thus lead to increased departure.
Identifying blame as a mechanism for increased departure, and separating attribution error on behalf of the board
from attribution error on behalf of executives, is not possible given the existing data set. Thus, while the results are
consistent with blame as a possible mechanism, I cannot rule out other mechanisms. Future research may wish to use
experimental methodology in order to address these questions.
2.8 CONCLUSION
The underrepresentation of women in top-management positions has received substantial attention within the eco-
nomics literature. While most studies have focused on differences in entry into management positions, a smaller set
of studies have instead looked at departure. These studies have largely shown that female executives exhibit higher
departure rates.
Why is it that female executives exhibit higher departure rates than male executives? One can think of many
possible answers to this question. Perhaps the simplest explanation would be gender differences in ability. In order to
test for this, one must examine gender differences in departure resulting from exogenous changes in firm performance.
In this study, I use exogenous changes in firm performance to rule out the ability channel and show that gender
differences in departure still persist. Specifically, using industry performance as an instrument for firm performance, I
show that following industry-wide contractions, the overall departure rate for female executives increases by approx-
imately 5 percentage points, while no change is observed in the departure rate for male executives. This increase in
departure cannot be explained by differences in fertility, early retirement, the glass cliff, or differences in external hire
rates. I argue that one remaining channel that is consistent with the observed increase in departure rates is misplaced
blame (e.g., attribution bias, self-attribution bias, or unreasonable performance standards).
While the results are consistent with a blame hypothesis, other competing mechanisms may remain. As such, one
avenue for future related research is using experimental methodology to test the blame hypothesis and separate out
self-attributed blame from external blame.
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3.0 THE SLIDER TASK: AN EXAMPLE OF RESTRICTED INFERENCE ON INCENTIVE
EFFECTS (CO-AUTHORS: FELIPE A. ARAUJO, ERIN CARBONE, LYNN CONELL-PRICE,
MARLI W. DUNIETZ, ANIA JAROSZEWICZ, DIEGO LAME´, LISE VESTERLUND,
STEPHANIE W. WANG, AND ALISTAIR J. WILSON)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Early economic experiments examining labor effort in the lab relied on the stated-effort design (for example: Bull
et al., 1987; Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Fehr et al., 1993)1. Participants in the role of
workers were given an endowment and asked to “purchase” a level of effort, which in turn benefited other participants
in the role of principals. While stated-effort designs provided well-structured controls for participants’ costs of effort,
the designs were seen as being abstract, overly distant from the types of labor effort the experiments were intended to
capture. Scholars subsequently began to use real-effort designs, where participants are instead paid for performing an
actual task in the lab.
Real-effort designs achieve less abstraction by trading off experimental control over the participants’ effort costs.
However, this lack of control of subjects’ costs restricts the types of tasks that can be used to study a response to in-
centives. For example, take a simple decision-theoretic model of a real-effort task. In choosing her effort e, participant
i solves the following problem:
e?i (w) = arg max
e∈[0,Ei]
w · fi (e)− ci (e) ,
where w denotes a piece rate payment, ci (e) denotes the (differentiable) cost of effort she brings into the lab, fi (e)
denotes her individual production function, andEi represents the maximum effort level she can choose to exert (due to
physical/time constraints). If we are to use a real-effort task to study the response to incentives in the laboratory, then
it must be—at least for the set of incentives considered—that the cost function generates both (i) an interior solution,
and (ii) an optimal rule e?i (w) such that that fi(e
?
i (w)) is not a constant over the set of incentives studied. For example,
a task that individuals see as enjoyable will not satisfy these restrictions. If it is satisfying to perform the task, then the
marginal cost is negative, 0 > c′i(e), and the same optimal effort e
?(w) = Ei will be chosen for all piece rates w ≥ 0.
1Reprinted with permisiion from Springer Nature: Springer, Journal of Economic Science Association, The Slider Task: An Example of
Restricted Inference on Incentive Effects, Felipe A. Araujo, Erin Carbone, Lynn Conell-Price, Marli W. Dunietz, Ania Jaroszewicz, Diego Lame´,
Rachel Landsman, Lise Vesterlund, Stephanie W. Wang, and Alistair J. Wilson, Copyright 2016
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Alternatively, even if the choice of effort is interior, the optimal effort rule could be such that fi(e?i (w)) = yˆ for some
constant output yˆ, for any wage w in the set of incentives studied. This could occur both if the cost of exerting effort
is unboundedly large beyond some point or if, perhaps due to low skill, the production function is not very sensitive to
changes in effort. In both cases, subjects’ behavior will not respond to incentives.
In real-effort tasks the experimenter does not observe effort per se, but only the resulting output. In our study,
as in most of the literature on real-effort, we use output as a proxy for effort. One inherent difficulty with this
approach is that output depends on both effort and ability. For a given increase in incentives, a low-ability subject
might substantially increase effort, but not output, while a high-ability subject might only slightly increase effort, and
achieve a substantially larger output. Even though our experimental design does not allow for a clean identification of
the ability and effort channels, the main contribution of the study, namely testing for a response in incentives, does not
hinge in identifying the exact mechanism at work.
The experimental community has been quick to develop creative real effort tasks. In considering easily imple-
mentable tasks that are short enough to be run repeatedly, the “slider task” has stood out as being sensitive to incen-
tives. Gill and Prowse (2012, hereafter abbreviated to G&P) introduce the slider task in a study on disappointment
aversion. Participants are shown a screen with 48 sliders, where each slider has a range of positions from 0 to 100.
Sliders are solved by using the computer’s mouse to move the slider’s marker (initially placed at 0) to the midpoint of
50. Participants are given two minutes to solve as many sliders as possible, with the participant’s chosen effort given
by the number of sliders correctly positioned at 50 by the end of the two minutes. The task is normally repeated ten
times and cumulative earnings across the entire experiment are given by
∑10
t=1 wt · fi(e?i (wt)).
Initial evidence from within-subject designs, that the slope of fi(e?i (wt)) was positive and large, has led to the
slider task being used frequently in papers measuring the incentive effects associated with various mechanisms and
work environments. However, in contrast to the sensitivity to monetary incentives uncovered in the initial G&P
study, more-recent slider-task studies (in particular, those using between-subject designs) find modest or non-existent
treatment effects. Our study’s main result, obtained from a simple between-subject experimental design, suggest that
these recent papers might not be viewed as true null results, but stemming instead from performance in the slider task
not being particularly sensitive to changes in the offered incentives.
Where other studies have varied more complex elements of the payoff environment (strategic elements within a
game, the nature of feedback, the frame, etc.) ours is a simple between-subject design, focused only on assessing
whether the slider task responds to monetary incentives. In fact, we are the only study to look at the slider task as a
decision problem, with direct monetary incentives varied between subjects so that experimenter-demand effects can
not drive the response to incentives. Building on G&P’s implementation of the slider task we conduct three treatments
where we vary the piece-rate payment w that participants receive for each correctly positioned slider: a half cent at the
low end, an intermediate two cent treatment, and eight cents at the high end. This sixteen-fold increase in the piece rate
corresponds to dramatic differences in participants’ potential earnings, with maximum possible performance payments
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of $2.40, $9.60 and $38.40, respectively. However, despite substantial differences in the incentives offered, we uncover
limited differences in average output: in order of increasing piece rates, we find that subjects complete 26.1, 26.6,
and 27.3 sliders per two-minute round. This less than 5 percent increase in response to a 1,500 percent increase in
incentives is limited both in magnitude, and relative to the rate of learning and to the individual heterogeneity in
ability.2
As a real-effort task, the slider task has many attractive characteristics. However, our study shows that the task is
not well-suited for uncovering responses to incentives in between-subject designs.
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experiments were conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, using subjects recruited from
the student population, randomly assigned to one of three possible treatments.3 Using a between-subject design the
piece rate is held constant throughout an experimental session, so that each subject i receives a fixed payment per slider
ofwi ∈ {0.5¢, 2.0¢, 8.0¢}.4 After instructions on the nature of the task, each session began with a two-minute practice
round for subjects to become familiar with the slider task. This was followed by ten paying rounds, each of which
lasted two minutes. In each round, subjects saw a single screen displaying 48 sliders of equal length and offset from
one another, as per G&P.5 At the end of each round there was a ten second break during which subjects were reminded
of how many rounds they had completed, the number of sliders completed, (Outputit) and their corresponding earnings
from that round (wi · Outputit).6
Once the ten paying rounds had concluded, subjects were asked to complete a survey.7 Only after completing the
survey were respondents informed of their total earnings for the session. Subjects were then privately paid, receiving
a $10 participation payment on top of their earnings across the ten rounds Wi =
∑10
t=1(wi · Outputit).8
In order to measure the extent to which the slider task responds to incentives, our study’s design adheres closely to
that employed in G&P. There are four main differences: i) The G&P design is within subject, where ours is between
subject. ii) G&P examine a game between two randomly matched subjects competing over a variable prize; ours
examines a decision problem, removing any externalities over payment. iii) The marginal incentives in G&P work
2Individual-level heterogeneity can be thought of here as the expected variation across subjects maximal effort Eit, while learning effects can
be thought of as within-subject shifts in this variable across time t.
3For consistency, one single member of the project read the instructions for all experimental sessions, and was assisted by another fixed
experimenter. All data was collected over the course of two weeks in April of 2015, where all treatments were gender-balanced and interspersed
across the data collection period. Initially, a total of three sessions were planned for each treatment; however, a computer error led to subjects’
terminals freezing in one round in one session. Another session was therefore added to have three complete sessions for each treatment.
4The effective marginal incentives for a risk-neutral subject in G&P varied within a session between 0.15¢ and 6.2¢ with an average of 3.1¢.
5The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007b), and the program KeyTweak was used to disable all arrow keys on the
keyboard, thereby ensuring that subjects only used the mouse to complete the slider tasks.
6Another difference between our design and the G&P design is that in their experiment subjects were given 2 minute breaks while they waited
for their opponent to complete the task.
7Data from the survey available from the authors by request.
8Subjects in our 0.5¢ treatment had their final payoff Wi rounded up to the nearest whole cent.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Treatment Output N Hourly Rate
Avg. Min Max
0.5¢ 26.1 6 44 42 $3.92
2¢ 26.6 12 41 43 $15.95
8¢a 27.3 10 46 63 $65.46
(27.4) (14) (46) (45) ($65.68)
Total 26.7 10 46 148
through a probability of winning a prize, where each additional slider completed leads to a one percent increase in the
probability of winning a prize; in our experiment the marginal incentives work through a fixed piece rate per slider
completed. iv) In G&P peer effects may be present, as subjects observe the other player’s output at the end of each
round; in our study there is no feedback on others’ effort levels.
3.3 RESULTS
Our experimental results are provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The first table, Table 3.1, reports the average number
of sliders completed per round (output), the minimum and maximum output, the total number of subjects N , and the
effective average hourly wage rate (as the incentivized part lasts 20 minutes, this is simply 3·Wi). On average, subjects
across all of our experiments complete 26.7 sliders in each two-minute period. The lowest number of sliders solved
by a subject in any round is ten, where the highest is 46 (two away from the 48 possible). Across treatments, we see
that output increases with the piece rate: the average output is 26.1 for the lowest incentive of 0.5¢, somewhat higher
at 26.6 for the middle incentive, and at its highest of 27.3 for the 8¢ incentive.
Just from the averages in Table 3.1 it is apparent that the size of the incentive effect is small: going from a piece-
rate of 0.5¢ to 2¢ leads to a 0.5 slider increase, and from 2¢ to 8¢ yields a 0.7 slider increase. Though the range of our
incentives represents a substantial increase—from an effective hourly rate of about half the US federal minimum to
just over $65 an hour9—this 1,500 percent increase in incentives yields less that a 5 percent increase in performance.
Across treatments and sessions, we observe substantial learning. Figure 3.1 presents the round averages for each
9By way of comparison, the average lawyer makes an hourly wage of $64.17 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, while the average
financial manager makes $62.61.
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of three treatments (where we have additionally provided bars indicating 95 percent confidence intervals, given subject
variation). In round one, the average output is 24.2 in both the 0.5¢ and 2¢ treatments, and 24.9 in the 8¢ treatment,
though the variation across subjects is large. Across the session, output mostly increases, so that the final output levels
in round ten are 28.6 in the 0.5¢ treatments and 28.9 in both the 2¢ and 8¢ treatments. While the output in each
treatment appears ordered according to incentives, it is noteworthy that the incentive order is only fully observed in
six of the ten rounds.10
Figure 3.1: Output Across Rounds
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10Output in the high wage treatment does appear to flatten out in the last few rounds moreso than in the other two treatments. We can think
of several reasons why this may be occuring. One possibility, for example, is that it could be the case that higher wages facilitate faster learning.
Another possibility is that this trend is due to random chance. Given that our experimental does not let us identify the cause of this trend, this may
be an area worth further study by future researchers.
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To quantify the effects from incentives while controlling for learning and subject-level variation, we run the fol-
lowing regression:
Outputit = β ·
(
wi−0.5
8−0.5
)
+
10∑
s=2
δs · 1s=t + η + ui + it
where ui is a subject-level random-effect, and it an idiosyncratic error. The regressions include the treatment as a
right-hand-side variable, rescaling the marginal incentive to run linearly from zero to one (0.5¢ at the low end, 8¢
at the high, with the 2¢ marginal taking the intermediate value 0.2), and additionally adds nine period dummies as
regressors, {δt}10t=2 and a constant η. The first column in Table 3.2 reports the estimates for the incentive effect βˆ,
the initial output level ηˆ at the beginning of the session, and the average amount of learning across the sessions δˆ10.
In addition, the table estimates the between-subject standard deviation, σˆu, as 3.5 sliders; while the within-subject
standard deviation, σˆ, is estimated to be 2.8 sliders.
Unsurprisingly, given the overall averages in Table 3.1, the estimated value of β—where the coefficient represents
the estimated marginal effect on sliders solved when moving from the 0.5¢ environment to the 8¢ environment—is
close to one slider. Controlling for variation between and within subjects, as well as the across-session learning, the
response to incentives is only marginally significant.11 Interestingly, even our participants appear to be aware that their
performance is not motivated by the payment they received. On the survey at the end of the experiment, we find that
three-quarters of the participants do not think that there is any lower piece-rate payment at which they would decrease
their performance.
Despite a sixteen-fold increase in the piece-rate, the variability in outcomes attributable to incentives is small
relative to other variations within the task. In terms of heterogeneity in natural ability, a one slider increase represents
under a third of a between-subject standard deviation. In terms of idiosyncratic variation, it represents slightly over a
third of a standard deviation. Across the entire session subjects seem to learn to complete more than four additional
sliders, relative to their output in round one. So the observed incentive effect represents less than a quarter of the
average learning effect. 12
The second column modifies the regression to use logarithms of the main dependent variable (log of completed
sliders) and shifts the right-hand-side incentive variable to measure it in logs.13 The interpretation of the β estimate
in the log regressions is the percentage increase in output as we increase the incentives by 1,500 percent. Though
closer to standard significance levels (p = 0.066) the estimate of the incentive effect remains very low. Similar to the
linear regressions, the 5 percent estimate of the incentive effect is low relative to the 17 percent increase attributable
to learning, and to the 12 to 13 percent effect from a within- or between-subject standard deviations.
11Including attempted sliders in place of completed sliders, we find an incentive effect of 0.82 sliders (p = 0.201).
12Allowing rounds to enter into our estimating equation linerly and including a round by treatment interaction term, we fail to reject the null of
no differences in learning effects between treatments (p = 0.64).
13More exactly, the RHS incentive variable in our log regressions is rescaled and renormalized so that the incentive runs linearly from zero to
one with the 2¢ marginal incentive taking the value of 0.5 (as our wage rates are 2−1, 21 and 23), where our linear regression had 2¢ representing
just 20 percent of the overall shift in incentives.
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Table 3.2: Random-Effect Regressions
Estimate Our Data G&P G&P Restricted
Linear Log Linear Log Linear Log
Incentive Effect, β 1.05a 0.05a 3.27c 0.12 2.67c 0.08
(0.65) (0.03) (0.75) (0.04) (0.65) (0.02)
Initial Output, ηˆ 23.98 3.15 21.11 2.95 22.70 3.10
(0.48) (0.02) (0.89) (0.06) (0.72) (0.03)
Learning Effect, δˆ10 4.34 0.17 4.35 0.19 4.24 0.16
(0.32) (0.01) (0.71) (0.05) (0.62) (0.02)
Between Std. Dev., σˆu b 3.47 0.13 5.40 0.27 3.91 0.15
(0.29) (0.01) (0.68) (0.06) (0.33) (0.01)
Within Std. Dev., σˆ b 2.77 0.12 3.87 0.29 3.22 0.13
(0.12 ) (0.11) (0.47) (0.08) (0.32) (0.02)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
a- A programming error led to one round in a single 8¢ marginal session hanging, so that data was not recorded
for that round. Results are similar if we remove the entire session from our analysis and so we conduct our
analysis on the entire data excluding this one round. The estimated incentive effect in Table 3.1(B) when
dropping this session is 1.16 sliders, where the test for significance has a p-value of 0.107.
b- Standard errors for between and within standard deviations are drawn from a bootstrap of size 1,000 that
resamples across subjects, then subject-rounds.
c -Marginal incentives for G&P first movers are calculated relative to our upper and lower incentive treatments.
Because of this ηˆ has the interpretation of average output (average log of output) in round one at a 0.5¢
incentive in all regressions, and β has the interpretation as the estimated marginal effect of going from a 0.5¢
environment to an 8¢ environment in all regressions.
d -In G&P Restricted we excluded all of their participants whose performance was lower than our worst
performing subject.
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Table 3.3: Power Calculations
$0.005 to $0.02 $0.02 to $0.08 $0.005 to $0.08
p=0.1 p=0.05 p=0.01
n=20 0.150 0.083 0.020
n=30 0.170 0.099 0.026
n=40 0.191 0.114 0.033
n=50 0.212 0.130 0.039
n=60 0.234 0.146 0.045
n=70 0.254 0.163 0.054
n=80 0.275 0.178 0.062
n=90 0.294 0.194 0.069
n=100 0.314 0.208 0.078
n=150 0.406 0.290 0.121
n=200 0.491 0.367 0.170
p=0.1 p=0.05 p=0.01
0.238 0.150 0.047
0.300 0.199 0.070
0.360 0.249 0.097
0.418 0.300 0.126
0.471 0.349 0.156
0.520 0.395 0.190
0.569 0.442 0.223
0.610 0.486 0.257
0.651 0.528 0.293
0.801 0.702 0.467
0.891 0.821 0.618
p=0.1 p=0.05 p=0.01
0.383 0.270 0.104
0.496 0.373 0.171
0.597 0.472 0.243
0.681 0.561 0.320
0.748 0.639 0.397
0.802 0.706 0.470
0.847 0.763 0.540
0.882 0.809 0.604
0.910 0.848 0.661
0.978 0.955 0.861
0.995 0.988 0.950
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Even if we disregard the small magnitude of the effect and only focus on significance, the slider task is severely
underpowered for uncovering a response to incentives with a typical experimental sample size. Table 3.3 shows the
power calculations for all pairwise treatment comparisons; 90% power is unattainable with fewer than 200 subjects
per treatment for both of our fourfold increases in incentives even at a 10% significance, while for a 1500% increase
in incentives we would need over 100 subjects per treatment to detect a significant difference 90% of the time at a 5%
significance level.
3.4 DISCUSSION
With a supply elasticity of only 0.003, our between-subject design finds that effort exerted on the slider task, proxied
by output, is very inelastic. We now examine how our results compare to G&P.
In G&P, two players i (a first mover) and j (a second mover) are randomly matched and compete to win a common
prize of size 100 · wit cents, drawn randomly from an interval. The probability of player i winning the prize is given
by 1100
(
50 + Outputit − Outputjt
)
, so for a risk-neutral participant the expected marginal incentive is wit.14 The
sequencing of the game is such that the first mover’s output (Outputit) is observed by the second mover j, and the
second mover’s response is the main focus in G&P. In looking at the response to incentives, we follow Gill and Prowse
(2015) and look only at the first movers.
As noted earlier, the first mover’s task in G&P is different from that in our study: i) Their sessions have within-
subject variation over the incentive wit, so subjects have some knowledge of the experimenter’s question, thus demand
effects may be present; ii) the tournament structure has own output inflicting a negative externality on the other
player; iii) payment is incentivized only probabilistically; and iv) there is feedback on other participants’ output levels.
Changes in levels may plausibly come from any of these differences, and future research might help isolate each of
these channels. However, it is still of interest to compare the magnitudes of the incentive effect in G&P and our study.
Paralleling the regression results from our data in the first pair of columns in Table 3.2, the next two pairs of
columns provide similar random-effects regressions from the G&P data. The first pair of G&P regressions provide
results under the linear and log specification for the N = 60 first-movers.15 The coefficient β˜ reflects the estimate
from the G&P data for the incentive effect in our experiment, showing that the G&P data predicts a significant 3.26
sliders increase as the marginal incentive is raised form 0.5¢ to 8¢. Our incentive estimate βˆ from Table 3.2 is much
smaller and is significantly different from the G&P estimate (p = 0.000).
The high incentive effect stems in part from a number of first-mover subjects who have very low output levels in
the G&P data. There could be several reasons for producing low output. One possibility that exists in G&P but not in
14The raw prizes in G&P are drawn uniformly over {£0.10, £0.20, . . . , £3.90} . We transform these to expected marginal incentives for a
risk-neutral agent, and then convert to US cents at a conversion rate of £0.65 = 100¢.
15To distinguish between estimates on our data and G&P’s we will use the notation βˆ, ηˆ, etc., for estimates from our data, and β˜, η˜, etc., for
estimates from the G&P data.
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our study is that subjects might be trying to pick the efficient outcome (both exerting zero effort and equally splitting
the chance to win the prize).16 As a partial control for this, we re-run the same random-effects regressions excluding
the G&P first-movers whose average output across the ten rounds is lower than the lowest subject average in our
between-subject data (18.5 sliders, from the 0.5¢ treatment). This excludes six subjects, representing ten percent of
the G&P first mover subjects.17
The regression results for the G&P subsample are given in the final pair of columns in Table 3.2. Though the
estimated incentive effect is lower than the full sample—decreasing to 2.67 sliders—our estimate is still significantly
different (p = 0.012). Moreover, despite the large differences in the estimated incentive effects, the other regression
coefficients are remarkably similar.
Looking at the results in the linear specification with N = 54 (where we remove subjects in the left tail of
the distribution), and comparing them to our results in the first column in Table 3.2, we find many commonalities.
First, subjects on average increase performance across the session by approximately four sliders (δˆ10 and δ˜10 are not
significantly different).18 Second, though the initial output level estimates of η are significantly higher in our sessions
at 24 sliders in comparison to 22.7 in G&P, the size of the difference is quantitatively small.19 Third, between- and
within-subject standard deviations for output after controlling for the incentive effects (σu and σ, respectively) are
very similar, though in both cases the estimated variation in our experiments is smaller than in G&P.
Comparing our results to those of G&P, it is hard not to attribute the majority of the observed incentive effect to
some combination of a within-subject effect (demand or peer effects) and a strategic or social effect (with the negative
externality pushing subjects to exert low effort). While we leave it to future research to disentangle which of these
factors are driving the additional incentive effects, it is clear that the effect observed in our data can at best be described
as marginal.
3.5 CONCLUSION
Using a between-subject design, we examine how performance on the slider task responds to changes in monetary
incentives. Despite a 1,500 percent increase in incentives we find only a five percent increase in output. With a supply-
elasticity of only 0.003 our results show that the slider task is poorly suited for studying the response to incentives in
between-subject designs.
Three recent studies point to techniques which might offer more-constructive results for real-effort tasks in the lab.
Ga¨chter et al. (2015) introduce a ball-catching task where the cost of effort is directly manipulated by the experimenter.
16Gill & Prowse (2015) note that 2 subjects (whom we will also exclude) appear to have difficulty positioning sliders at exactly 50 until a few
rounds into the session.
17Note that only subjects with low average performance are eliminated from the data. Data from subjects with particular rounds with less than
19 sliders completed are still included in the analysis, provided that the subject’s average across the session is above 18.5 sliders.
18All three of our treatments, as well as both movers in G&P show fairly consistent increases in average output across the session.
19A joint regression across both sets of data indicates no significant difference over the two constants (p = 0.123).
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With suitable parameterizations, interior solutions can therefore be ensured. Less directly, Corgnet et al. (2014) and
Eckartz (2014) examine a variety of real-effort tasks and find that the presence of outside leisure activities and paid
outside options, respectively, lead to stronger incentive effects. These different approaches—the one with greater
experimental control, the other with greater flexibility extended to subjects—suggest possible solutions for researchers
wishing to use the slider task in a between-subject design.
While there are several reasons that the incentive effect might be larger in the G&P data, our study motivates
future research on the potential greater sensitivity in within-subject designs.20 One explanation for stronger results
in within-subject designs is that they allow for better controls for the large variation in individual-level ability of the
slider task.21 An alternative, but undesirable explanation, is that the additional response is an experimenter-demand
effect. Future research is needed to identify the cause of these between/within-subject differences.
Whatever the cause, a reasonable criterion when using any real-effort task to study the incentives is a demonstrated
response to explicit monetary incentives between subject. Statistical significance aside, desirable tasks should be able
to demonstrate an incentive effect which is measurable in magnitude, and large relative to uncontrolled variation within
the task (individual ability, learning, etc.). With respect to this above criterion, our study sounds a cautious note for the
slider task. While the task has many appealing properties it is underpowered for uncovering a response to incentives.
20In mirroring responses to incentives in labor markets one may wish to think of within designs as capturing short-term effects and between
designs as capturing long-run responses.
21If this is the main channel, one way to reduce noise from individual heterogeneity is to measure baseline ability via a common task with a
fixed incentive level at the start of each treatment, a` la Lilley and Slonim (2014), with subsequent tasks chosen with the desired between-subject
variation.
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APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figure A.1: Difficulty Adjusted Compensation - First Four Periods
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Figure A.2: Difficulty Adjusted Compensation - All Five Periods
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